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1. Introduction 
A film distributor launches a film by contracting with a geographically dispersed set of cinemas 
and arranging an associated publicity campaign. The detail of contracts struck between the 
distributor and individual cinemas varies, but there is a c o m m o n pattern to the arrangements. 
Standard contractual features include: clearances protecting the theaters from local competition 
with the same film; a minimum run requirement; a weekly rental paid by the movie theater 
depending on box-office revenue; and a hold-over clause. 
The revenue sharing provisions of the contract play an important role in our analysis. For a 
Hollywood-style film, the contract typically requires a rental payment to the distributer which is 
the larger of a) a significant percentage (for example 90%) of the box office revenue less an 
amount equal to the house nut1 and b) a lower percentage (for example 7 0 % ) of the gross ticket 
revenue with no coverage of the house nut. The rest of the box-office revenue accrues to the 
cinema. The percentage paid to the distributor in the second alternative typically falls over the 
length of the run. Contracts for a top-of-the-line picture also involve a guarantee, which 
represents a minimum total amount payable to the distributor for booking the film. The guarantee 
must be paid before the distributor ships the motion picture to the cinema. The distributor does 
not receive additional weekly payments from the cinema until its share of box-office revenue 
exceeds the guarantee. W e assume that risk considerations explain the sharing as suggested by de 
Vany and Walls (1996). 
In addition to exhibiting the movie, the cinema sells snack foods-popcorn, soft drinks, candy, and 
the like— to its patrons. The profit from the snack bar accrues only to the cinema and is 
significant. Since the cinema receives only a relatively small fraction of the marginal increase in 
box office revenue and all of the revenue from the sale of snack foods, its incentives and those of 
the distributor with respect to what ticket price should be set are not always well aligned.2 In 
some circumstances the cinema will set the price lower than that which would generate the largest 
box office revenue. Presumably, because of this conflict, distribution contracts with cinemas 
sometimes stipulate a minimum ticket price which the cinema may charge, in jurisdictions where 
such a clause is legal. 
The house nut ostensibly covers rent or mortgage payments, taxes, depreciation, staff, overhead and other 
operating costs. Murphy (1986, 244) points out that the figure is negotiated. "It is not arrived at by examination of actual 
records; the exhibitor announces his claimed costs, and the distributor accepts or rejects." He also notes that the same 
cinema m a y be granted a different house nut by different distributors. 
2With respect to the United States, Conant reports: "...refreshment profits are a major part of net earnings and 
theaters would close without such sales."(1981, 564). Mr. Karp, the President of Cineplex Odeon, a large Canadian-owned 
chain of cinemas operating in both the United States and Canada noted in discussing the chain's pricing practices: "... 
programs such as half-price admissions on Tuesdays, matinee discount admissions and cheap tickets for teen-agers eat into 
box office revenue, but that drop is more than offset by higher concession-stand revenue." Globe and Mail, M a y 26,1992, 
B9. Statistics Canada data for the early 1990s indicate that about one quarter of the total revenue of Canadian cinemas was 
generated by concession sales and three quarters from ticket sales. Of the box-office revenue slightly under half is paid to 
the distributor on average. 
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M a n y of the contracting practices of the film industry have been viewed with suspicion by the 
anti-trust authorities. Minimum-ticket-price clauses are no exception. In the United States, the 
Paramount consent decrees, which followed the Supreme Court's Paramount decision in 1948, 
terminated an anti-trust initiative begun in 1938. They forbade, inter alia, the setting of a 
minimum ticket price by the affected distributors.3 
In Canada, the policy of including a minimum admission price clause in contracts with cinemas has 
a long history. In 1926, Canada followed the lead of the United States in adopting a standard 
exhibition contract. The 1928 Canadian contract called for an admission fee of at least ten cents 
unless a greater fee were specified elsewhere in the contract.4 In the 1970s, a number of Canadian 
competition policy actions were taken against distributors with respect to including minimum 
ticket price restrictions in their rental contracts with cinemas. 
In both countries, the restrictions imposed by competition policy on the use of minimum price 
clauses have been weakened following their introduction. In the United States, the minimum-price 
prohibition was circumvented by the introduction of a contractual clause making the distributors 
share depend on a stipulated royalty per admission. Since 1953, the position of the U.S. Justice 
Department has been that "a per capita royalty charge did not constitute fixing rrrinimum 
admission prices."6 Fox has imported this American innovation into Canada and has negotiated 
contracts with Canadian cinemas based on revenue at a "full ticket price." (Houle 1994, 68). 
According to the same author, independent operators are challenging the "full ticket price" 
initiative by filing a complaint with the Canadian competition policy authority. 
In the process leading to the Paramount decision, the District Court ordered competitive bidding 
''For a detailed description and analysis of the Paramount decrees, see Conant (1969, 1981). The Paramount 
decision was United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 344 U.S. 131 (1948). Conant 1981,539 provides references for 
the five consent decrees reached with the five majors of the day, Loew's ( M G M ) , Paramount, R.K.O., Twentieth Century-
Fox, and Warner Brothers. D e Vany and Eckert (1991) question the wisdom of some of the constraints imposed on the 
industry. 
White, Peter (Commissioner), Investigation into an Alleged Combine in the Motion Picture Industry in 
Canada, Department of Labour, Canada, April 30, 1931, p. 194. 
In 1977, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. was found guilty of not allowing a theater owner to reduce entrance 
prices and fined $1,250, which was raised to $5,000 in 1978, and granted an Order prohibiting it and its directors, officers, 
servants and agents from doing any act directed towards the repetition of the offence. In 1979, United Artists Corporation 
was charged with unlawfully attempting to discourage the reduction of the price of the theatre admissions with respect to 
three films, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, Missouri Breaks, and A Bridge Too Far. A n order was issued prohibiting 
any attempt to influence upward or discourage the reduction of the price at which motion picture exhibitors charge 
admission to their theaters by the Federal Court of Canada. In the same year, Bellevue Film Distributors Limited was 
charged with attempting to influence upward the price of admission for children to three drive-ins operated by Canadian 
Odeon Theaters Limited in Welland and St. Catharines, Ontario and received a similar order. See Annual Report, Director 
of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act, Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1980 and 
later. 
6Claudia Eller, "WB is Putting Per Capita Minimums on all Films" Variety May 6, 1991, 20. 
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and not divestment. The Supreme Court reversed this decision and ordered divestment and not 
competitive bidding. All of the contractual and structural changes resulting from the decision and 
decrees altered the contracting process between distributors and cinemas in the United States. 
After Paramount, a distributor circulated a bid request containing information, such as name, 
credits, and a plot summary, 6 to 12 months before release. Cinemas responded by offering 
revenue sharing terms, an advance, a minimum run commitment and other terms (Trotiner, 1984, 
159-60). The current method of letting a contract varies considerably among the states of the 
United States, reflecting differences in state laws and market conditions. In some states, films are 
distributed under an auction process while in others they are negotiated in a more flexible 
framework. 
In Canada, a 1983 agreement was reached between the major distributors and the Director of 
Investigation and Research in response to pressures from a Canadian-owned cinema chain, 
Cineplex, which wanted to increase its access to top-line films. This undertaking introduced 
procedures designed to protect a qualified cinema from being shut out of the first-run market for 
films. After the undertaking's implementation, Cineplex and other small chains and independent 
cinemas received more open access to the films of the major distributors. This regime only lasted 
for a short period before Cineplex took over Odeon, a large established chain of cinemas which 
had been "in the loop" before the undertaking. After that takeover, pressure to maintain the 
processes of the undertaking subsided.7 A partial reversion to the former reliance on informal 
negotiations and developed relations between particular distributors and cinemas has occurred. In 
both countries, the policy of barring minimum price clauses has been increasingly circumvented by 
the use of per-capita royalty clauses or sharing revenue based on a full ticket price. This change in 
policy has occurred without much debate. 
The minimum ticket price is the focus of this study. This vertical constraint occurs in a contract 
featuring successive market power, as the snack bar is the only legal source of confections for the 
patrons and a related Disneyland tiering, as the potential film-goer assesses the price of the snack 
bar "ride" as well as the film in deciding whether to buy a ticket. Our model incorporates these 
two features. It tracks industry practice by combining an auction process with negotiation for 
allocating the right to show the film. The contract specifies a revenue sharing proportion and 
grants an exclusive local right or clearance. 
2. The model 
We model the interaction between the distributor and the cinemas as a two-stage game. In the 
first stage, a distributor solicits bids for the right to exhibit a film from a set of n cinemas, indexed 
1,..., n, each of which faces a different potential demand for films and snack foods. For simplicity, 
See Annual Report, Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act, Ottawa: Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs Canada, 1984 for details of the undertaking. Magder (1993, 206) describes the reversion to what he calls 
an "entente cordiale". 
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the only costs of the cinema that are avoidable are constant per unit costs of snack foods. Units 
are chosen so that this cost is zero. Distribution to the cinema is assumed to be costless. 
The demands for tickets and snack foods are generated from a fixed number of individuals in the 
area being licensed. Each of these individuals is represented by a taste parameter, 0, which is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1] and is independent of the cinema exhibiting the movie. 
A person either chooses to see the movie once or not at all. There is no demand to see a movie 
more than once. The utility which individual 0 derives from seeing a movie shown at cinema l 
(measured in money) is &$, a^O, i=l, 2,..., n. If this individual decides to attend the movie, he or 
she has a demand price (a reservation price) for one unit of snack foods of Cj0+dj, d^O, and q + 
d 2 *0. Cinemas differ in the demand for their services which may vary for reasons such as location 
or amenities. Given that all of the n cinemas have the same costs, each cinema is fully described by 
the vector of the demand parameters, (a^ ct, dt), for its services. 
The right to exhibit covers a single period so there is no consideration of duration of run. Besides 
exhibiting the movie, the cinema sells snack foods on its premises. A ticket buyer cannot take 
snacks into the cinema from outside. 
The first stage is a bidding game. Each participating cinema submits an offer of a guarantee and 
the cinema with the highest bid wins the right to participate in the second contracting stage of the 
process. The participation by a cinema in the bidding depends on the other exhibition alternatives 
available to it. Some cinemas choose not to bid. 
The second stage comprises sequential games, each of which determines a vertical contract with 
the distributor as the upstream entity and the selected cinema as the downstream entity. In the 
contract, the distributor sets a ticket revenue sharing percentage, K, and if permitted by law, may 
set a minimum ticket price.8 The cinema then sets the price at the snack bar and, if the distributor 
does not or cannot legally limit ticket pricing, the price for tickets. 
We assume that the cinemas have full information in both stages. They know their own demand 
parameters and those of other cinemas as well as the alternatives available to themselves and their 
rivals. The distributor lacks information as to the value of other alternatives for each of the n 
cinemas and therefore does not know which cinemas will bid in the first-stage. Once a cinema is 
selected in the first stage, the distributor has the same complete information as the cinema during 
the second stage interaction. This structure of information makes the first stage bidding game and 
the second stage contracting games ones of complete information. 
We analyze the vertical constraint on ticket pricing, a minimum ticket price clause, by comparing 
the subgame perfect equilibria of the game with and without the constraint. The results with 
vertical integration between distribution and exhibition are also calculated. As a first step, w e 
UIQ sharing aspect is represented by only one arrangement as compared to the more complex contingent 
formulas that characterize actual contracts. 
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develop the demands for tickets and for snack foods in more detail.9 
3. The demands facing the cinema 
Denote the price of a ticket for admission as F and the price of a unit of snack foods as P. F^O 
and P^O. The demands facing each cinema depend on its parameters but the form is the same for 
every cinema. 
Each potential movie goer has full information about F and P and considers both the value of 
watching the movie and the option to consume snack food at the price P when deciding whether 
or not to buy a ticket. For the cinema which has contracted to show the movie, individual 0 for 
w h o m a;0>F will buy a ticket and will also buy snack foods within the cinema if and only if 
(Ci0+drP)>O. Individual 0 for whom aj0<F but (ai0+ci0+di-F-P)>O will buy both a ticket and a 
unit of snack foods. W e assume that a person will buy a ticket and/or a unit of snack foods if he 
or she is indifferent. 10 
The parts of the population who buy a ticket and who buy snack foods generate the total demands 
for tickets and for snack foods respectively. Suppose cinema i has the right to exhibit and each 
member of the population has a nonnegative correlation between its reservation price for 
admission and its reservation price for snack foods, i.e., Cj>0. The total demand for tickets (DJ is: 
D..= 
1 if F>0, P>0, F+P<d;, (/?,) 
1-— if 0<F<a(., Pz-i-F+d;, P<c+d-, P>0; 
ai at 
1-— if 0<F<a, P>c.+4, P>0; (/?,) 
ai 
0 if F>ap F+Pia.+c^dp P>0; (R4) 
F+P-d. 
1- '-
<*,) 
(D 
a.+c-
if F>0, P>0, d^F+Pza.+c.+d? P<—F+d,.; (Rs) 
ai 
and the total demand for snack foods (Dsi) is: 
Some of the calculations and proofs are not reproduced in the text but appear in a separate set of appendices 
which are available from the authors. 
ion These two assumptions make the demand functions for tickets and for snack foods lower semi-continuous 
on P when C;=0, and do not affect the conclusions reached in the paper. For instance, if c~0, suppose F=0. Everyone will 
go to the cinema and buy snack foods for VP<d, while no one will buy snack foods if P>cL That is, the demand function for 
snack foods is lower semi-continuous but not upper semi-continuous on P at P=di if Ci=0. 
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D..= 
1 if F>0, F>0, F+P<d;, (/?,) 
P-d: 
1- '- if O^F^flp P^-i-F+d? PzCi+d? F*0; (rt2) 
0 if 0<F<a., F^q+dp F>0; (K3) 
0 if F>a,., F+Pzdi+Ci+dp F>0; (rt4) 
F+P —d 
1 i if F>0, F>0, d^F+Pzcii+Ci+dj, Pz—F+d;, 
(2) 
a;+c; 
a. 
(RO 
Figure 1 illustrates the regions R„ R2, R3, R4 and R5.
n If F and P are in region R1; all the people 
will go to the cinema and buy snack foods within the cinema. If F and P are in region R2, some of 
the people will go to the cinema and some of these movie goers will buy snack foods. If F and P 
are in region R3, some of the people will go to the cinema but none of these movie-goers will buy 
snack foods. If F and P are in region R4, no one will go to the cinema. If F and P are in region R5, 
some of the people will go to the cinema and all of those that do will buy snack foods. 
a;+c;+d 
Figure 1 
With c~0, region R, vanishes. In this case, expressions (1) and (2) with their second components 
deleted represent the demands for tickets and for snack foods respectively.12 
"Although Figure 1 is drawn with a^d;, (1) and (2), as well as any result based on (1) and (2), apply to the 
situation where a1<d1. 
12r 
Exclude the second expressions in (1) and (2), plug c~0 into other expressions and modify the term "P^oy (the 
term "P^c.+d," before plugging c~0) of the third expressions of (1) and (2) into "P>d". This property allows the 
conclusions held for the situation where c,>0 to apply to the situation where c,=0. Details of these calculations are 
available in appendices C and D and an alternative method for calculating the demands in appendix A. These appendices 
are available from the authors. 
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When there is a negative correlation between the reservation prices for admissions and those for 
snack foods (c;<0), the total demands for tickets and for snack foods can also be readily 
calculated. Unfortunately, with c;<0, to solve for the equilibrium in the model is much more 
complicated than with c^O.13 In order to shed some light on the effects of prohibiting the 
niinimum price clause with ct<0, we analyze a particular case in which c—-^ and a/4<di<ai.
14 
In this case, the total demand for tickets (D^ and that for snack foods (Dsi) are: 
D.= 
(1-—) if 0<F<^, F+P>dt\ P>0 (Qx) 
d 
1 if 0<F<<L, F+P<dp F>0; (Q2) 
0 if F>dt, P>0; (fi3) 
(3) 
D = 
0 if O<F<0,, F+P>df, P>0 (g,) 
d-P 
if 0<F<fl(, F+P<d-r F>0; (Q2) 
d-
0 if F>dt, F>0; (Q3) 
(4) 
The regions Qv Q2 and Q3 are shown in Figure 2. If F and 
P are in region Q2, all of the people go to the cinema but 
only some of them buy snack foods. If F and P are in 
region Q1? some of the people will go to the cinema but 
none will buy snack foods within the cinema. If F and P 
are in region Q3, no one will go to the cinema. 
Q! 
Figure 2 
4. Equilibrium in the model 
In the second stage of the game, the distributor offers the cinema, which bids the highest 
guarantee, a contract with a percentage K and if legal, may include a minimum F clause. 
Anticipation of these contractual terms and the known competition from other cinemas condition 
13n The method used to solve the model with c,^0 does apply to the one with c;<0, but with c,<0, there are too many 
situations to be identified in order to obtain explicit solutions to the model. 
14 l ( 'a^d" implies that, among the people who attended the movie, the highest utility someone realizes from the 
movie is not lower than the highest utility some other individual realizes from snack foods. Assuming a/4<d, simplifies the 
calculation of a solution. The model with c^-% and a^dj can be similarly handled as that with c~-a, and a^dj. 
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the bids of the cinema in stage 1. The two stages of the model are illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 
3. The bidding game is described in panel (b) and is characterized by the distributor choosing the 
cinema which bids the highest guarantee.15 
Stage 1 
(a) 
D: Distributor 
CI: Cinema 1,1=1,2,..., N 
D & CI: Vertical contract between D and CI 
(b) 
Figure 3 
Each game of stage 2 shown in panel (a) of Figure 3 depends on the type of contract which the 
distributor can offer the cinema which has bid the highest guarantee. If limiting ticket pricing is 
legal, the distributor has Y^ and the minimum F> as strategy variables while cinema i has strategy 
variable P; and ¥r The minimum F; is a factor only if it is binding. In this situation, the distributor 
effectively sets the price of the cinema through the minimum ticket price clause. If setting a 
minimum ticket price in the contract is illegal, the distributor has ¥^ as strategy variable while 
cinema i has strategy variables P; and F;. 
The guarantee bids of the cinemas, Ni? where i=l, 2,..., n and N; e [0,BJ, depend on the 
contracting regime. W e assume that the cinemas know whether the distributor can set a K and a 
15T If more than one cinema bids the highest guarantee, the distributor chooses a cinema from among the subset 
that offers it the most potential in the resulting bargaining game. 
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rrrinimum F or just a K, when they are requested to bid.16 It is also c o m m o n knowledge that the 
distributor will not introduce an alternative contracting form, e.g., one involving no sharing of 
box-office revenue, once a cinema has been chosen as a result of the bidding game. This 
"inflexible" assumption implies that the amount of the guarantee does not affect the strategic 
behavior of the distributor in the stage 2 game, and makes it simpler to characterize the 
equilibrium of our model (see the theorem of the next section). 
In stage 2, the distributor specifies terms within the understood type of contract to capture as 
much of the joint profit as is possible. Let N ; denote the guarantee offered by cinema i. Contingent 
on winning the auction cinema i anticipates the following sets of payoffs with 7tD(N;) representing 
the profit of the distributor and TCC'(N) the profit of cinema i. Then 
7rD(N)=max{KiFDti,Ni}, (5) 
7TCi(N)=FDti + PDsi - max {K.FD,,, N,}. (6) 
The payoffs of cinemas which are unsuccessful in the auction are zero. Note that (5) reflects that 
the distributor receives "overage" only when K iFD u>N i. In order to identify the equilibrium, w e 
must calculate the optimal contract for the distributor with each cinema both with and without the 
vertical constraint on ticket price respectively (see panels (a) and (c) of Figure 4).17 W e also 
investigate the situation where the distributor and the cinemas are merged (Figure 4 panel (b)). 
16Note that the distributor is unable to specify a general price floor for tickets in this model when asking for offers 
of guarantees because it does not know which of the cinemas will take the contract when it issues its request for bids. In 
the second stage it specifies the details of the contract in light of which cinema has revealed itself as valuing the right most 
highly. 
The distributor and the cinemas are assumed to maximize their own profits. We assume the "friendly" tie-
breaking rule that when a cinema is indifferent it will choose the best alternative for the distributor among the indifference 
set. More specifically, the cinema taking the contract will satisfy demand for snack foods even if P=0. Similarly, if the 
cinema taking the contract wants to set F = 0 and has that right, the distributor is committed to delivering the film for 
viewing. 
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Distributor 
K; 
Cin'ema i 
(a) 
separated and 
with vertical constraint 
Distributor 
Cinema i 
|P|F 
separated and 
without vertical 
constraint 
Figure 4 
If cinema i wins the auction, the equilibrium contract from the second stage game determines the 
following functions. They represent the profits of the two players, ignoring the guarantee.18 
7U cm-IQFD t l + PD s, 
(7) 
(8) 
Results 1 and 2 below describe the profits, (7) and (8), and the consumer surplus in two regimes, 
one in which a vertical pricing constraint is legal and one in which it is not legal. Competition 
among the cinemas may generate a guarantee above the profit that could be obtained by the 
distributor from its choice of contract terms. This competition effect does not change the prices of 
tickets or food and therefore leaves consumer surplus unchanged. It distributes income from the 
cinema to the distributor. W e discuss the choice of bids and the effect of competition in more 
detail after presenting results 1 and 2. 
Result 1: With (7) and (8) as the objective functions of the distributor and cinema i, if a;>0, q>0 
and dj>0, and if the distributor is permitted to set a minimum ticket price, the equilibrium contract 
between the distributor and cinema i as well as the associated surplus of movie-goers (S) are 
If the guarantee binds, the distributor receives the guarantee and the cinema receives the sum of the two profits 
described in (7) and (8) less the guarantee. The guarantee only redistributes the joint profits realizable in stage 2 under the 
stipulated contracting regime. 
characterized by:19 
a a (d+c+d)2 
(l)If d+c-yd-. d.<-L and ^ > V ' ' ' , 
2 4 8(0,+c,) 
/"• ,-• ci d; n. n a- d+C; 
TP =7cc'=-i+-i, TT D'=TC D=-1, S=-i-i; 
1 4 2 ! 4 8 
a, a- (a.+c.+d,)2 
(2)If d-+c.>d-, d-<— and — < ' ' ' , 
' 2 4 8(a,+c;) 
2 a+c.+d- d+c+d- 3 i 
V^ e[|,min(l,^ )], F'^-i. ' ' ^ T ^ f " ^ 
16(a.+c.)
 ] 8(fl/+c.) 32(a.+C.) 
A. 
(3)If d-+c-zd- and d > — , 
2 
2 d+c+d- d+c+d- 3 i 
3 " 2/r; 2 2 £.* 
1_ 16(ai+Ci) '
 1_ 8(flr+C/) ' " 32(ai+ci) ' 
(4)If ai+c<di and <i(<3(a-+c.), 
o a+c+d- d+c+d- 3 i 
V«:;e[-,min(l,A:iI)], F* = i ' ', F*= ' ' ' [ - - — ] , 
3 2K' 2 2 £.* < 
^ a _ c / ("i+Cj+d,)2 {d-+c.+d)2 ja+c+d)2 
7T ,=7T = , 71 ,=7t = , 6= : 
1 16(a.+c.) ! 8(a+c,) 32(ai+Ci) 
(5)If dft3(a.+c^ 
See appendix C for proof. 
d-d-c- d-d-c-
V£,'e[ ' ' ',1], F*= l ' ', P*=d-F\ 
di K* 
7rJ°'lS7i
Ci=^+ci, it
Di
1=n
D=rf.-fl.-ci, S="^p 
2(a,+C;)(a.+c,.+d;) 
In the above, £ = ' ' ' ' ' 
d- d- (d+c+d)2 ,.-. 
If d+c.>dp d<— and — = — • — • — — , multiple equilibria may exist and generate different 
2 4 8(a.+c,.) 
surplus for movie-goers and profits for the cinema. In the set of equilibria, different combinations 
of K and F realize the same profit for the distributor. 
Result 2: With (7) and (8) as the objective functions of the distributor and cinema i, if aj>0, Cj>0 
and dj>0, and if the distributor is not permitted to set a minimum ticket price, the equilibrium 
contract between the distributor and cinema i as well as the associated surplus of movie-goers (S) 
are characterized by:20 
(l)If c->4 and c/-c^2-2a^.2>0; 
a-(c--d) c+d-
K.*=l, F*= ' ' ' , P*=-i—i, 
2c. 2 * 2 d(C2~d2) (n^*\(~^A\2. 
7U 2=7t = ; , 71 9 = 7X = , S-
4ci 4c2 8c. 
(2)If cpd. and c?-cfi2-2dfl2<0; 
See appendix D for proof. 
K* is the unique root to Z(K)=0 with Ke[0, 1], 
F,_[(l-^X+c.-d.]a, pt [(l-Kpdj+Crdfc d 
2[(1 -K^+c,] ' ~ 2[(\-K*)d+c^ '' 
4[(l-tf>,+c,.] 4[(\-K*)d+c$ 
S= 
_(ai+c)[(\-K<)a+c-+dZ 
2 
mi-Kpa^cf 
(3)If ci<di and d+c>d;, 
K* is the unique root to Z(K)=0 with Ke[0, 1], 
F,_[(l-K*)di+c-dl]di pt_[(\-K*)d+c-d^ci d 
2[(l-^ .*)fl.+c.] ' " 2[(\-K*)d+c}
 + '"' 
4[(\-K*)a+c} ' ' 4[(1-K>(+C/.]
2 
^(d.+c^a-Kpaj+c.+df 
8[(i-^.x+c-r 
(4)If c<dt and d+c<d;, 
\/K*€[0,l), F*=0, F*=d,, 7rc'2H7r
c'=^, 7rD'2=7i
D=0, S=^^-: 
In the above, Z(£)=[(l-£)a,+c.]3-[(l-K)a+c}d2-2afl2K 
Results 1 and 2 are summarized in Table 1 and 2 respectively, with the subscript su 
To provide some illumination of these results, we present 3 special cases in Appendix *. 
Table 1 Summarization of Result 1 
a>0, c>0, d>0 
a+c>d 
d<a/2 
d^ (a+c+d)2 
4" S(a+c) 
K* = l, 
F*=^, 
2 
P'=-+d, 
2 
7U C=£ +^ 
4 2 
4 
- d+C 
8 : 
a _ (d+c+d)2 
4' S(d+c) 
VK*e[-,rmn(l,Ks)], 
3 
„» d+c+d 
2K' 
pt_d+c+dr3 1 , 
2 2 K* , 
^c_ (d+c+d)2 
I6(a+c) ' 
^D_ (d+c+d)
2 
S(d+c) 
r_(d+c+d)2, 
32(a+c) ' 
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Table 1 Summarization of Result 1 (continued) 
a>0, c>0, d>0 
a+c>d 
d>a/2 
V/re[|,min(l,/Q], 
,-,» d+c+d 
r , 
2/r 
p,_a+c+dr3 1 , 
2 2 K* 
^c_ (d+c+d)2 
16(a+c) ' 
^D_ (d+c+d)2 
%(d+C) 
„_(d+c+d)2. 
32(a+c) ' 
a+c<d 
d<3(a+c) 
V/re[-,min(l,/Q], 
3 
~» d+C+d 
F = , 
2/r 
p,_a+c+d.-3 1 , 
2 2 £• ' 
^c_(«+c+^02 
16(a+c) ' 
nD_(a+c+d)
2 
8(a+c) 
^(tf+C+d)2. 
32(a+c) ' 
d>3(a+c) 
VAT*6[d"a"c,l]f 
E,, d-d-c 
r , 
K* 
P*=d-F*, 
if-d+C, 
-nP-d-d-c, 
c d+C 
5" 2 ' 
Table 2 Summarization of Result 2 
a>0, c>0, d>0 
c>d c<d 
c2-cd2-2adh0 c3-cd2-2ad2<0 
d<a+c d>a+c 
K'=l, 
f._a(c-d) 
2c ' 
p._c+d 
2 
c_(c+d)2 
4c 
a(c2-d2) 
•R 
T? 
Ac2 
(a+c)(c+d)~. 
8c1 ' 
K' is the unique root 
to Z(K)=0 with Ke[0, 1], 
F._[(l-K')a+c-d]a 
2[(l-K')a+c] 
p._[(l-K
m)a+c-d\c id 
2[(1-K')a*c] 
,c_ [(!-£>+c+J]2 
4[(1 -K')a+c] ' 
^__K.a[(l-K')a,cf-d
2 
4[(l-K')a+c]2 
s_(a+cW-K')a+c+d]
2. 
8[(l-£>+c]2 
7t 
fif" is the unique root 
to Z(K)=0 with Ke[0, 1]. 
c._[(\-K*)a+c-d\at 
2[(l-Km)a+c] 
0,_[U-K')a+c-d]c ,d 
2[(l-K')a+c] 
KcJ(l-K')a+c+d)
2 
A[(\-K")a+c] 
^__K.a[(l-K')a+cf-d'' 
S= 
A[{\-K')a^c]2 
(a+c)[(l-K')a+c+d]2. 
S[(l-K')a+c]2 
VK'e[0,\], 
F'=0, 
P'=d, 
nc=d, 
•nP =0, 
c a+c 
2' 
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With these results w e return to the stage 1 bidding game. The upper limit for a bid by cinema i in 
this game is Bj, =7iCih +7t
Di
h, with h=l if the distributor may include a minimum ticket price or 
h=2, if otherwise, and 7iCih and 7t
Di
h are given by result 1 if h=l or result 2 if h=2. 
Define Y={l,2,3,...,n} andZ^{i | ieYand B^maxfB^B^ B^B^}}. Not all cinemas may 
participate in the auction. For the cinema, say cinema w, which does not participate in the auction, 
w e can assume B w h = O.We assume that the characteristics of the cinemas, the elements of the set 
{(a^qdi) | ieY } vary sufficiently that Z^ includes only one element, say Z„ = {zh}. In this case, 
the following theorem characterizes the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the bidding game. 
Theorem: If Z^izh}, where h=l if the distributor specifies that a minimum ticket price will be 
included in the contract in its request for bids or h=2 if that is not the case, all the pure strategy 
Nash equilibria of the bidding game are characterized by 
{ VN^etN^, max {7i^h, N^*}], VN/e[0, min {BJh Nj}], VjeY\{zh}}, (9) 
where N,*=max{ B^ | ieY\{zh} }, and it1**,, is given by result 1 with i=zl if h=l or result 2 with 
i=z2ifh=2.22 
Proof: If cinema zh submits a bid less than N,^*, some other cinema can obtain the contract 
through bidding Ntal*, leaving cinema zh without a contract. Suppose 7t
Dzh
h>Nhm*, if cinema zh 
bids from [N,^*, itDzhh ], it will win the contract with its profit being 7t
Czh
h; if cinema zh were to 
submit a bid larger than 7rDzhh, it would still obtain the contract, but its profit would be less than 
7tCzhh. That is, cinema zh benefits most to bid from [N,*, maxiTi;
02^, N^*}]. Cinema j, 
VjeY\{zh}, should not submit a bid larger than min{Bjh, N , * }, because it would be worse off 
obtaining the contract under those terms; it can bid in the interval [0, min{Bjh N^,*}], but will not 
win by doing so. Therefore, all the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the bidding game are 
characterized by (9). Q.E.D. 
These equilibria lead to the unique outcome that cinema zh obtains the contract with the 
guarantee N^* paid to the distributor. The equilibrium profits of the distributor and cinema zh are: 
7iD(N)=max{7iD2hh,Nhm*}, (10) 
7 1 ^ ( ^ = 7 1 ^ +7r
c*h - max {^\ r O , ( H ) 
In addition to identifying a cinema which can generate the largest joint profit, the auction process 
may raise the guarantee because of the impact of the anticipated bids of competitors on the 
winner's bid. This effect can occur because N , * is independent of (a,,, c^ d*) and the guarantee 
22 
Recall the "inflexible" assumption governing the distributor's behavior. Without this assumption, a cinema 
could bid a bit larger guarantee and negotiate with the distributor not to ask a percentage for sharing the profit from 
admissions (and not to limit ticket pricing if h=l), so that it could expand its profit by realizing the joint profit potential 
from full integration. 
is at least N^*. If the competition is so strong that Nm* >7t
Dzh
h, the distributor procures more 
profit from the guarantee than from the contract imposed. In particular, if Zj, includes more than 
one element the guarantee is the joint profit the cinema can produce, leaving the cinema itself with 
zero profit. 
zl, Nlm\ z2 and N2m* are revealed by the cinemas; the distributor does not know them before it 
closes the auction. Therefore, the model does not require that a distributor, which has the legal 
right to set a minimum price, specify that it will or will not do so in requesting bids according to 
zl, N l m \ z2 and N 2 m \ 
5. Assessing banning minimum ticket price constraints 
In this section, we analyze the implications of banning a minimum ticket price clause by 
determining whether a contract with or without the vertical constraint produces more or less 
profit plus consumer surplus. For this purpose, we suppress the identity of the cinema that 
receives the contract by ignoring its subscript and denote its guarantee as N*. Since the guarantee 
only affects the distribution of profits between the distributor and the cinema and not prices, joint 
profit or consumers surplus, the following results hold independent of the guarantee, except for 
propositions 1 and 2. For simplicity, w e denote the joint profit, the total surplus of movie-goers 
and the social welfare (the sum of the joint profit and the total surplus of movie-goers) in the 
equilibrium contract of result 1 (Table 1) as Jv Sx and W t respectively and those in the equilibrium 
contract of result 2 (Table 2) as J2, S 2 and W 2 respectively. Based on results 1 and 2, the 
following propositions hold if there is a non-negative correlation between the reservation price of 
viewing the movie and of enjoying the snack foods. Appendix B of "Appendices" contains the 
proofs of the propositions in this section unless a footnote attached to the proposition or a part of 
it indicates another reference for the proof. 
Proposition 1: 
(i)Ticket Price: In the equilibrium contract of result 1, F*>a/2 ; in the equilibrium contract of 
result 2, F*<a/2, and if d>0, F*<a/2. 
(^Distributor's Profit: itDi*a/4; 7tD2<a/4, and if d>0,7i
D
2<a/4. 
(iii)Cinema's Profit: Tt^Tt0-,. More specifically, if d=0 and the distributor chooses F*=a/2 in the 
equilibrium contract of result 1, the cinema's profit will be the same in the equilibrium contract of 
result 1 and in that of result 2; otherwise, the cinema's profit will be lower in the equilibrium 
contract of result 1 than in that of result 2. 
Discussion: The distributor is always at least as well off with the right to set a rrvinimum price (ii) 
as without that right. The proposition delineates the demand conditions in which the distributor 
may benefit and the cinema may be damaged by the distributor exercising such a right. The "may" 
appears in the preceding sentence because competitive conditions also influence the effects on the 
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cinema of the distributor including a minimum price clause. For example, if competition is weak 
so N*<TC D 2 and d>0, the distributor will receive more profit by constraining ticket pricing and the 
cinema's profit will be less. With sufficiently intense competition among the cinemas, the winning 
cinema makes zero profit under either contracting regime. 
Proposition 2 (Joint Profit): 
(i)If 0<d<£(a+c) and (21£^t<± fJl>Ja. 
6 8(a+c) 4 
(ii)If &(a+c)<d<3(a+c) , or if (a+c+d>2>! and d<3(a+c), or if either d=0 or 
6 S(a+c) 4 
(d+c+d) =d and d<3(a+c) but the distributor does not choose F*=-^ in the equilibrium 
S(d+c) 4 2 
contract of result 1, Jj < J2. 
(iii)If d>3(a+c), or if either d=0 or d=&(d+c) and (^C+ <T , or if either d=0 
6 S(d+c) 4 
or d=^-(d+c) and i£I£I~L=£ and the distributor chooses F*=- m the equilibrium 
6 8(a+c) 4 2 
contract of result 1, J^Ji. 
Discussion: If the reservation price for food is low compared to the reservation price for viewing 
the movie, i.e., both c and d are small relative to a, the total profit of the cinema and the 
distributor is less when a vertical price constraint is forbidden than when it is allowed. W h e n the 
opposite relation between the demand parameters governs, the opposite is true. 
Proposition 3 (Movie-goers' Surplus and Social Welfare): 
(i) S,<S2; and if 0<d<3(a+c), St<S2. 
J3 
(ii) If 0<d<i— (d+c) , or if d=0 but the distributor does not choose F * = — in the equilibrium 
6 2 
contract of result 1, W^W-,. 
(iii) If d> 3(a+c), or if d=0 and the distributor chooses F * =— in the equUibrium contract of 
result 1, W,=W2. 
Discussion: Although proposition 2 indicates that with some demand configurations, joint profit 
may rise if the distributor is allowed to set a minimum ticket price, this proposition states that the 
fall in consumer surplus will be at least as large. Making legal the vertical constraint of the price 
of admission never raises welfare. 
Proposition 4 (Price of Snack Foods): 
(i) If d>a+c and the distributor has the right to set a minimum ticket price, the cinema sets a lower 
price of snack foods.23 
(ii) If c=0, the price of snack foods will not be higher with the vertical constraint than without; 
and if c=0 and d>(-Jz.-\)a , the price of snack foods is lower when a minimum price clause is 
legal.24 
(iii) If d=0, the price of snack foods will not be higher in the equilibrium contract of result 1 than 
in that of result 2.25 
Discussion: If d<a+c, we cannot determine a simple relationship between the snack food price 
and the legality of the vertical pricing constraint.26 Although the price of snack foods may be 
raised or lowered by a policy of forbidding a minimum price clause, the combined price, the sum 
of the price of a ticket and that of a unit of snack foods, will not be raised. 
6. Forbidding a vertical price constraint and vertical integration 
The Paramount decrees required that the five major studios of the day divest their cinema chains. 
Currently, many of the studios own chains of cinemas which compete with large independent 
national and regional chains in the United States. The American anti-trust authorities have not 
actively opposed the reappearance of vertical ownership links. 
23Results 1 and 2 imply (i). 
with Table 1-1 and Table 2-1 of Appendix *, we only need to show 
P*= [— ]<d when d>(J2-\)a . This follows from 
2 2 /r 
P-=«l±[l-J-U^[l-i]<l[d+-A-]<d . 
2 2 K* 2 2 4 ^ . i 
5Self-evident from Table 1-2 and Table 2-2 in Appendix * . 
26For instance, if 0<d<a/10 and c=a/2, P*=a/4 + d in Table 1-3 of Appendix * while P*=a/4 + d/2 in Table 2-3 of 
Appendix *. 
In Canada two national chains dominate cinematic exhibition. O f these, Viacom controls Famous 
Players while Universal Studios and the other national chain, Cineplex Odeon, have c o m m o n 
controlling shareholders.27 Cineplex Odeon has recently agreed to merge with the cinema chain 
owned by Sony Pictures to form Loews Theaters Exhibition Group.28 The regulatory authorities 
in Canada have approved the project while those in the United States are currently vetting the 
proposal. In short, a substantial portion of the Canadian exhibition industry is vertically integrated 
with major Hollywood studios. 
In 1932 the Crown charged Famous Players and a group of other companies and individuals of 
contracting practices and other actions designed to put independent film exhibitors out of 
business.29 The charges against all the defendants were dismissed.30 More recently, Canadian 
policy has concentrated on protecting Canadian distributors and periodically squeezing 
commitments from the foreign-owned distributors and cinemas to support Canadian cultural 
policy objectives.31 
The profession views vertical contracting as an imperfect substitute for vertical integration. With 
the non-negative correlation between reservation prices, we found that permitting a vertical price 
constraint never improved welfare and sometimes reduced it. In the next section, w e examine how 
introducing the possibility of vertical integration affects welfare. 
Result 3: If the distributor merges with a cinema, and if a>0, c^O and d^O, the integrated entity 
will treat admission and a unit of snack foods as a combined good. The customer pays a single 
price and can view the movie and consume a unit of snack food. If d<a+c, the merger will set the 
price of this combined good at (a+c+d)/2, i.e., F*+P*=(a+c+d)/2, subject to 
2 Seagrams, which is controlled by the Bronfman family, owns a majority interest of Universal. Universal and the 
Charles Rosner Bronfman Trust control Cineplex Odeon. 
^Tie merged company "would have 2700 screens in 450 locations, mostly in major cities in Canada and the 
United States, and generate about $1-billion in annual revenue." The merger has been approved by the Canadian 
authorities subject to Cineplex divesting itself of its distribution activities in Canada. U S federal and state authorities and 
Cineplex's minority shareholders must approve before the merger can be consummated. (The Globe and Mail Feb 18 
1998, B5). 
29 
The action was brought under the Combines Investigation Act. The Crown made a number of different charges. 
Jarvie (1992) provides a list on p. 37. The Crown also maintained that the Standard Exhibition Contract was illegal. Jarvie 
discusses the Commissioner's Report (April 30,1931) which recommended laying criminal charges and the trial 
30 
Rex v Famous Players, March 18, 1932. 
31 In the post World War II period the majors participated in the Canadian Co-operation Project in which thev 
promised to promote the sale abroad of National Film Board films about Canada, to insert some Canadian sequences in 
U.S. feature films, to distribute fewer "low-toned" gangster films, among other commitments (See letter from E Johnst 
to J J. Fitzgibbons in Collins 1979). In the mid 1970s the two dominant Canadian chains guaranteed four weeks ner ve 
each theater to Canadian films and to invest $1.7 million or more in their production (Gathercole 1983, 30) 
0<P *<- —+d , with the merger's profit TZM=- — and the total surplus of movie-
2(a+c) 4(a+c) 
goers S=- — ; if d>a+c, the merger will set the price of this combined good at d, i.e., 
%(a+c) 
F*+P*=d, subject to 0<P*<d, with the merger's profit 7tM=d and the total surplus of movie-
goers S= ,32 These results are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 Result 3 
d<a+c 
F*+ p,_d+c+d 
2 
( ( k p^+c-d)c 
2(d+c) 
nM_ (d+c+d)
2 
4(d+c) 
<,_ (d+c+d)2 
8(a+c) 
d>a+c 
F*+ P*=d 
( 0<P*<d ) 
nM=d 
2 
The combined price for a ticket and a unit of snack foods, (F*+P*), set by the merger will 
generally be lower than that in the equilibrium contract of result 1 but higher than that in the 
equilibrium contract of result 2. This is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 7: With a>0, c>0 and d>0, 
•p » p •^ | ,p * ,p * i <F * +P * \ 
'separated without vertical constraint— I merged- 'separated with vertical constraint 
32This result can be easily obtained from appendix D, where if K = 0 and the distributor is not permitted to set a 
minimum ticket price, the pricing of a cinema under contract will be the same as that of the merged firm. 
. d Xd+C+d)2 33 o:miiflr 
Figure 5 illustrates proposition 7 when d<a+c and -< ^ • 
figures can be drawn for other ranges of the parameters. The combined price for^a tickett of 
aLssion and a unit of snack foods can be any point on E G in the equihbnum contract of result 1 
while it is uniquely at point H in the equilibrium contract of result 2. With integration of the 
distributor and the cinema, the combined price can be any point on C D . 
Figure 5 
From results 1, 2 and 3, merger produces a profit that is at least as great as the joint profits from 
results 1 and 2, and the largest total surplus of movie-goers is obtained by the equilibrium contract 
of result 2. The regime in which minimum price clauses are illegal and there is no vertical 
integration generates the largest social welfare. These results support proposition 8. 
Proposition 8: With a>0, c>0 and d>0, 
v*' " I separated with vertical constraint— I merged- \ separated without vertical constraint ' 
\") " I separated with vertical constraint— I merged- I separated without vertical constraint ' 
This proposition states that integration provides at least as much consumer surplus and welfare as 
contracting with a vertical price constraint. If the government makes a vertical price constraint 
2(ai+c)(a+c +d) 
K s for cinema i was defined earlier as K = '•—• . In Figure 5, panel (a) corresponds to 
a[3(a+c)-d^ 
K^l and panel (b) to K^l. If K=l, points G and N in panel (b) of Figure 5 coincide. 
illegal, it should also ban vertical mergers. If a minimum price clause is legal, the government 
should permit mergers. 
6. Negative Relationship between the Reservation Prices 
The above conclusions about how the different contracting regimes and vertical ownership links 
affect welfare depend on the assumption that the population has a nonnegative relationship 
between its reservation prices for tickets and snack foods (c>0). W e develop an example to 
illustrate that the same conclusions do not generally hold for the negative correlation case. In the 
example, c=-a and a/4<d<a.34 
Result 4: If a>0, a>d>a/4, c=-a, and if the distributor can limit ticket pricing, the equilibrium 
without a guarantee generates the following profits, surplus of movie-goers, and social welfare: 
/T = l, F*=d, P*=0, 7tc=0, Tr°=d, S=i^l, W=^~ . 
2a 2a 
Result 5: If a>0, a>d>a/4, c=-a, and if the government bans setting minimum prices, the 
equilibrium decisions ignoring the guarantee generate the following profits, surplus of movie-
goers, and social welfare: 
(l)If d<- , 
3 
K* = l-±, F*=d, P*=0, nc=^, *P=^W, S=^-, W--?-^; 
a a a 2a 2a 
(2)If ?-<d , 
3 
„» a+d „» a+d D, 3d-d r_(d+d)
2 „p_(a+d)2 
A. , r , r , Tt , 7i , 
2d 4 4 16a 8a 
s_(3d-d)
2
 w_6(a+d)
2+(3a-d)2 
32a ' 32a 
Result 6: If a>0, a^d>a/4, c=-a, and if the distributor and the cinema merge, the integrated entity 
will set F *=d and P*=0 , and earn profit of nM=d . Movie-goers experience consumer 
34The proofs of results 4 and 5 are presented in appendices E and F respectively. Result 6 is implied by the 
calculations in appendix F. Results 4 and 6 are characterized by the same prices of admission and of a unit of snack food, 
total profit, consumer surplus and social welfare. 
surplus of S=——— and social welfare 
2d 
is W= 
a2+d' 
2d 
Table 4 summarizes these results. 
Table 4 Results 4, 5 and 6 
Result 4 
/r=i 
F*=d 
P*=0 
7TC=0 
7lD=d 
5_(a-d)
2 
2a 
2a 
Result 5 
d<— 
3 
/T = l--
a 
P*=0 
c <*2 
I T -
a 
nD_(a
-d)d 
a 
s_ (a
-d)2 
2a 
W-
a2+d2 
2a 
dz° 
3 
yt_d+d 
' 2a 
F,_a+d 
4 
p,_ 3d-a 
4 
^cjd+d)2 
16a 
no_ (d+d)
2 
8a 
s_(3a-d)
2 
32a 
w_6(a+d)
2+(3d-d)2 
32a 
Result 6 
F*=d 
P*=0 
nM=d 
s_ (a-d)
2 
2d 
W - ^
d 2 
2a 
Figure 6 illustrates the differences between results 4 and 5. Forbidding the distributor from 
vertically restricting ticket pricing can increase the consumer surplus of movie-goers but decrease 
social welfare because of a more than compensating fall in total profit. Making a minimum ticket 
price clause illegal may reduce the ticket price and the profit of the distributor and raise the snack 
food price and the profit of the cinema. All three panels have the same combined price of a ticket 
and of snack food. ^ 
In this case, the social welfare may decrease when the cinema sets both the price of admission and 
that of snack foods. When the distributor sets the price of admission, the cinema chooses the nrice 
of snack foods to be zero and earns no profit. When the cinema controls both prices and the 
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demand for snack food is sufficiently high ( dz— ), it raises the price of snack foods and reduces 
the price of admission by the same amount. These changes in prices do not attract more movie-
goers but reduce the amount of snack food they consume once in the theater. For those that 
continue to consume snack food, the profit of the cinema offsets the loss in consumer surplus. For 
those that do not consume snack food at the higher price, there is no offset for their loss of 
surplus. In the assumed demand circumstances, banning the minimum ticket price clause does not 
raise welfare and may lower it.35 
44 a/3 
(D) 
Result 4 Result 5 
Figure 6 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Our model captures two important features of real-world contracting in the film industry, the 
sharing of box-office revenue and the letting of the contract by a mixture of auction and 
negotiation processes. W e compare the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this model in two 
contracting environments-one in which a vertical price constraint is legal and one in which it is 
35The results shown in Figure 6 also hold for the contract with a guarantee under the "inflexible" assumption 
except for the results shown in panels (C) and (D). 
not. W e also calculate the profit maximizing prices, profit and surplus generated by an integrated 
distributor-cinema. In the 1970s in Canada only some Canadian cinemas complained to the 
Competition policy authorities about the minimum price clause. The model is consistent with that 
observation as the minimum price constraint only binds for cinemas with particular demand 
configurations. 
If the reservation prices of watching the movie and of eating snack food are non-negatively 
correlated and a minimum price binds, the ticket price is set by the distributor. The cinema's profit 
potential is restricted and economic surplus is reduced by the higher film price. Banning vertical 
price constraints is justified in terms of the standard "a dollar is a dollar" welfare measure. If a 
minimum price clause is banned, vertical integration never improves and sometimes decreases 
welfare. The coupling of the two anti-trust measures is supported. If w e added a prior stage to the 
game in which the government chose policy and its payoffs were determined by the welfare 
measure of consumer surplus plus total profit, its equilibrium strategy would be to ban minimum 
price clauses and vertical integration. The optimal policy with respect to vertical mergers depends 
on the configuration of other instruments chosen by the government. If the government does not 
ban rninimum price clauses, it should allow vertical mergers. 
These policy implications depend on the "nonnegative assumption." As our example illustrates, a 
minimum ticket price clause can raise welfare when this assumption does not hold. Although the 
empirical incidence of negative correlations may be low, there is no theoretical reason w h y they 
should not exist. Therefore even within the confines of the model and the welfare measure used, 
the analysis does not support a per se prohibition of the minimum price clause but does support 
making it a reviewable practice. 
We make other assumptions-unit demands, linear reservation prices, constant unit costs, no fixed 
costs, and a uniform distribution of consumer types-to simplify the calculations. Despite these 
simplifications, the calculations are complex. W e expect that the basic conflicts in interest which 
generate our results will give similar results in models with different assumptions along some of 
these dimensions, but cannot prove that assertion.36 
Some additional comments about three aspects of the model should help in assessing its strengths 
and weaknesses. These aspects are the "inflexible" assumption, the affect of competition on the 
equilibrium, and the one-shot nature of the game. 
The "inflexible" assumption plays an important role in the model. Without it, the cinema expects 
that once it wins the right to contract the distributor will not extend a box-office sharing contract 
but will negotiate alternative contracting arrangements designed to achieve a profit closer to the 
S v e can speculate about the effects of relaxing some of the strictures of the model. For example, if the 
distributor both owns a cinema chain and contracts with independent cinemas, it m a y have good information about the 
alternatives available to the cinemas. The distributor then knows which cinema will be able to generate the most profit 
can initiate negotiations directly by demanding a guarantee, a sharing percentage and fixing a minimum ticket price if 
legal. 
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joint profit maximum. This amount can then be split assuring the cinema and the distributor more, 
or as much, as they would have received with the inflexible specification of the game.37 Another 
way of revealing the problem raised by the inflexibility assumption is to ask why does the industry 
continue to contract on a box-office revenue sharing basis? W h y does the film distributor not rent 
the cinema at a flat fee?38 
A partial answer is that the contract also distributes risk. The making of a major motion picture is 
an extremely risky activity. This is reflected in industry rules of thumb such as "only one film in 
ten makes money" and in formal statistical analyzes (e.g., D e Vany and Walls, 1996). The 
distributors shoulder a considerable portion of that risk through their contracts with producers. 
Cinematic exhibition on the other hand is not as risky an activity. Under most contracts, the 
cinema has considerable say over the duration of a run. If a particular movie fails to draw an 
audience, the cinema quickly posts a new title on the marquis. The sharing rules and the evolution 
of the percentages over the duration of a run may well reflect the laying off of some risk by the 
distributor to the cinema. In this paper, w e made the analysis manageable by not introducing risk 
directly into the contracting game. A possible defense of our approach is that w e recognize risk by 
limiting the contract to one with a guarantee and revenue sharing. W e then make the resulting 
contracting game manageable by not explicitly introducing risk considerations within it. 
This line of thought prompts a further question. If risk shifting explains revenue sharing, why does 
the contract not share all sources of revenue to the cinema? Measurement costs may offer an 
answer. The film industry has developed an extensive monitoring and accounting system for box-
office revenue. Box-office statistics are published in the trade press and are monitored not only by 
the distributor but also by the film's producer, director, lead actors, technicians and their unions if, 
as is often the case, they have contractual claims that directly or indirectly depend on the 
distributor's share of box office revenue. 
Fast food franchise contracts include revenue sharing provisions, but the apparatus to monitor and 
enforce revenue sharing on concession sales have not developed in the cinema industry. W e 
assume that it is too costly, given the non-uniformity of the snack food operations from cinema to 
cinema, the absence of other mutual dependencies typical of a franchise contract, and the low 
volume of sales in comparison to a fast-food outlet. In the absence of such a governance structure 
for snack food revenue, risk shifting occurs through sharing box office revenue. 
We have discussed the importance of the intensity of competition among the cinemas in 
determining the transfer of rents between the cinema bidding the highest guarantee and the 
In anticipation of this the winning cinema, say cinema 1, would bid a guarantee from [0, B,] with B,, the joint 
profit maximum for cinema 1, which is the max of {uDj,, N* } , with j representing either regime 1 or 2 and N* ^max {B„ 
B 3 BJ. 
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Contracts of this type are observed for low-value films and occasionally are adopted by a producer who believes 
strongly in the value of their product and decides to invest in creating word-of-mouth support for a film by entering what 
are called "four-wall" contracts with cinemas. 
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distributor. Although the distributor in the model is a monopoly seller of the exhibition rights for a 
particular film competition from the distribution side also affects the analysis in our model, albeit 
indirectly. The expected audience appeal of other films and their quantity determines the number 
of cinemas which will participate in the bidding game. The demand parameters of a cinema will 
also reflect the expected quality of other films being offered. The cinemas do better when there 
are more films offered with similar box-office potential. 
The one-shot nature of our model limits its credibility. Cinemas depend on a steady flow of 
pictures and distributors require the simultaneous availability of a set of cinemas with broad 
geographical coverage to launch a first-run film. This interdependence encourages repeat 
business. The prospect of continuing relations can limit the incidence of opportunistic behavior by 
the parties and reduce monitoring. The parties can adjust contractual terms in response to the 
history of previous experiences. W e acknowledge the desirability of making this extension but 
were deterred because of its complexity. 
Finally, a brief caveat concerning the policy suggestions that emerge from the analysis. Because 
producing films is a creative activity with uncertain returns, it raises many of the same managerial 
challenges as research and development. The information asymmetries at the heart of these 
challenges also result in constricted financial flows to the industry. Distributors play a critical role 
in the restricted private financial networks available to film producers. Contractual environments 
which allow distributors to raise more money from their portfolios of films compensate for the 
dampening effect on film production of being cut off from traditional capital markets and 
intermediaries. This gain may outweigh the cost identified in this paper. Sacrificing the welfare 
losses from allowing the vertical pricing constraint may be a cheaper way of subsidizing film 
production than subsidies by government film funding agencies or tax shelters. 
28 
Appendix A: Derivation of the demand functions 
Given F and P, if a6^F, i.e., 6^F/a, the individual indexed by 0 buys a ticket; if a6<F, but a6+c0+d-F -P^O, 6 
will buy a ticket, as well as a unit of snack foods. These two relationships determine the following two sets: 
X,(F,P)H{6| 0e[O, l],02F/a,FsO,P*O}, 
X2(F, P)={0| 0e[0,1], 0<F/a, a0+c0+d-F-P^O, F^O, P^O}. 
X,nX2 is empty and the total demand for tickets is the sum of the linear measures of these two sets. Since a finite 
number of points do not affect the linear measure of a set, X2(F, P) can also be defined as 
X2(F, P>{0| 0e[O, 1], 0<F/a, a0+c0+d-F-P^O, FsO, P2O}. 
Defined in this manner X2(F, P) is always closed. 
Let M(.) denote the linear measure operator for a set. 
When, a+c>0. 
M(X2(F,P))= ' 
0 if F+P>a+c+d, F>0, P>0; 
— if 0<F<a, F+P<d, P>0; 
a 
1 if F>a, F+P<d, P>0; 
F__F+P-d .f F+p^ p<£ F + r f > F<fl> F > 0 t p>0; 
a a+c a 
0 if P>-F+d, F>0, P>0; 
a 
l_F+P-d if f^a diF+P<a+Cf P>0. 
a+c 
The total demand for tickets is the sum of M(X,(F,P)) and M(X2(F,P)), which can be calculated by a standard 
three-step process. Step 1: Add each expression of the right-hand of M(X2(FJP)) to each expression of the right-
hand of M(X,(F,P)). Note that the associated constraints are also added. This will give us 12 expressions. Step 2: If 
the feasible set of an expression is empty, exclude this expression. Step 3: Exclude redundant expressions of the 
remaining expressions. For example, the sum of the first expression of M(X,(F,P)) and the third expression of 
M(X2(FJ
>)) is redundant because it is contained by the sum of the first expression of M(X,(F,P)) and the second 
expression of M(X2(F,P)). It is excluded. With this approach, and with a+c>0, the total demand for tickets (Dt) can 
be expressed as 
D, 
1 if F+P<d, F>0, P^O; 
1-— if 0<F<a, P>-F+d, P>0; 
a a 
0 if F>a, F+P>a+c+d, P>0; 
F+P-d 
a+c 
if d<F+P<a+c+d, P<—F+d, F>0, P>0; 
a 
Now consider the total demand for snack foods. Some persons in X, may buy snack foods. They comprise the 
following set X3: 
X3(F,P)={8| 8e[0, l],0^F/a,F^O,PsO,c0+d-P2O}. 
In the situation where c>0. 
M(XJF,P))= \ 
0 if P>c+d, F>0; 
1-- if 0<F<a, 0<P<-F+d; 
a a 
\-£zl if 0<F<a, P>-F+d, p<c+d; 
c a 
0 if F>a, F>0; 
The total demand for snack foods when a+c>0 and c>0 is the sum of M(X2(F,P)) and M(X3(F,P)). Using the same 
process, the total demand for snack foods (Ds) can be expressed as 
1 if F+P<d, F>0, F>0; 
1--^ if 0<F<a, P>-F+d, P<c+d P>0; 
c a 
D-\ 0 if 0<F<a, P>c+d, P>0; 
0 if F>a, F+P>a+c+d, F>0; 
. F+P-d .. , _ _ r 
1 if d<F+P<a+c+d, P<—F+d, F>0, F>0; 
a+c a 
N o w (1) and (2) of the paper can be obtained by rewriting D, above according to the feasible regions of D s 
In the situation where c=0, X3(F, P) is reduced to X31(F, P): 
X31(F,P)S{6| 8e[0, l],8iF/a,F^0,Pi0,d-Pi0}. 
M(X31(F,F)) = 
0 if P>d, F>0; 
F 
1 — if 0<F<a, 0<F<d; 
a 
.0 if F>a, P>0; 
The demand functions for the situation c=0 are:39 
D,= 
1 if F+Pid, F>0, P>0; 
1-— if 0<F<a, P>d\ 
a 
0 if F>a, F+P>a+d, F>0; 
Z71 D A 
1 — — — if d<F+P<a+d, P<d, F>0, F>0; 
*>,-
1 if F+P<d, F>0, P>0; 
0 if 0<F<a, P>d; 
0 if F>a, F+P>a+d, P>0; 
C D 7^ 
1- if d<F+P<a+d, P<d, F>0, P>0; 
To derive (3) and (4): 
With c=-a, X2(F, P) becomes X21(F, P): 
X21(F,P)^{8| 8e[0, l],8<F/a,d-F-P*0,F*0,P*0}; 
X3(F, P) becomes X32(F, P): 
X32(F,P)M0| 8e[0, l],8^F/a,F2 0,PsO,-a0+d-P^O}. 
M(X21(F,P))-
0 if F+P>d, F>0, P>0; 
— if 0<F<a, F+P<d, P>0; 
a 
1 if F>a, F+P<d, P>0; 
M(X„(F,P))= \ 
0 if F>a, P>0; 
0 if P>tf, F>0; 
0 if F+P>of, P>0, F>0; 
£^L-- if F>0, F+F<d, P>d-a, P>0; 
-a a 
1-— if 0<F<a, F+P>d, P<d-a, P>0; 
a 
If a^d, M(X32(F, P)) is reduced to 
39"P>d" in the first expression of M(X31(F, P)) can not be written as "P;>d" because M(X31(F, P))=l-F/a if P=d 
and (kFsa. This implies that the total demand function for snack foods is not continuous on P at P=d. 
0 if F+P>d, P>0, F*0; 
M(X32(F,P))= \ Pj±.L if F>0, F+P<d, P>0; 
-a a 
The sum of M(Xl(F, P)) and M(X21(F, P)) is (3), the total demand for tickets. That of M(X21(F, P)) and M(X32(F, 
P)) is (4), the total demand for snack foods. 
Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 
\(\-K)a+c-d\a . 
In Figure B.l, some points of V Q can be represented by a parameter K, with F(/Q = 2\(l-K)a+c] ^ 
= [(\-K)a+c-d]c +d Accordingly^ at these p0ints Qf line VQ, the joint 
2[(\-K)a+c] 
Drofit J(K) -[(1"-g)a+C+^2 + £aIiL£Hl£J "
rf" and the total surplus of the movie-goers is 
V 4[(\-K)a+c] 4{(\-K)a+c] 
S(K) =(a
+cm-fQa+c+d]2 The sodal wdfare is W(K)^j(K)+S(K). 
&[(l-K)a+c? 
In region ABVQ, the joint profit is J= — L [ F + P - - ^ ^ ] 2 + [a+c+d] . At the points (F(K),P(K)) of line 
5 a+c 2 4[a+c] 
VQ, y(/o = -^-[F(/0+PW-^£^r-+I^^: . 
a+c 2 4[a+c] 
Recall that Z(K)=[(\ -K)a+c]3 - [(1 -A>z+c]d2 -2adzK , as defined in result 2 of the paper. In the 
equilibrium contract of result 2, with K" as the unique root to Z(K)=0, if 0<K*< 1, J(K') and S(K") are respectively 
the joint profit and the total surplus of movie-goers; if K*>1, the joint profit and the total surplus of movie-goers 
are respectively J(l) and S(l); if K"<0, the joint profit and the total surplus of movie-goers are respectively J=d and 
S=(a+c)/2. 
W e have 
dJ(K) a2d2K 
(Bl) 
dK 2[(1 -K)a+c]3 
dS(K) _ ad(a+c)[(\ -K)a+c+d] 
dK 4[(1 -K)a+cf 
(B2) 
W(K) _ ad{(a+c)[(l -K)a+c+d]-2adK 
dK 4[(l-K)a+c]i 
(B3) 
Z'(K)=-3[(\-K)a+cYa-ad1<0 (equality holds only when [(l-K)a+c]2+d2=0) (B4) 
Let J, and W , denote respectively the joint profit and the social welfare in the equilibrium contract of result 1 while 
J2 and W2 denote those in the equilibrium contract of result 2. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
(i) In the equilibrium contract of result 1, if 
(a+c+d)2 a .-.•,• zr» a 
—<— , which implies d<a+c and c<a, r = — , 
S(a+c) 4 2 
r>. c , , , _._,, a+c+d d ... r. • 
P =—+d , and thus F +P = + — , the joint profit is 
2 2 2 
J = (_)2+l L . In the equilibrium contract of result 2, with K * as the unique root to 
a+c 2 4(a+c) 
Z(K)=0 FV=^ 2*1 iSK-il or F%P*=-2^+£^ if K'>\ 
2 2[(l-K*)a+c] 2 2 
Accordingly, the joint profit 
J =J(K') = -—( 
adK ,2 (a+c+d)
2 
Y + — or a+c 2[(\-K')a+c] 4(a+c) 
/=/(!) = — ! _ « - + 
I ad 2+(a+c+d)
2 _Tnerefore^ if K^x 
a+c 2c 4(a+c) 
. T d adK 
JX<J2 _ _>. 2 2[(l-K')a+c] 
adK 
Let Ko denote the unique root to — = — — • • — — , then 
Kn=^—- , with 0<Ko<l for c<a and (l-Ko)a+c=(a+c)/2 >0. 
2a 
a+c+d P=(c/a)F+d 
z(Ko)=£I£[£I£-V3<fl[^*V3d] 
1 9 
(B5) 
By(B4), K0<K* - Z(KQ)>Z(K*) - ^ y > f i
d • 
By(Bl)(notethatd*0),if KQ<K* , then JrJ(K0)>J(K') .If K'>\ , we directly have 
J^M^Jd) for K0<\ . 
(ii)If l±(a+c)<d<3(a +c) , in the equilibrium contract of result 1, 
6 
« a+c+d ^d orF.tp._d+c+d {a+c+d Jf F%/>.=£I£l£+i ,asabove, Z(tf0)<0 . 
2 2 2 4 2 2 
Therefore, KQ>K * for such K' that Z(K >0 -If ^^0 ,by(Bl), Z^, .If K *<0 , which 
implies a+c<d, then /, = +—<d=J, . 
1 4 2 2 
Tr C-.D* a+c+d a+c+d , 1 ra+c+d,i (a+c+d)
2 
11 r +r = + , J,-- L J + 
2 4 a+c 4 4(a+c) 
With d<3(a+c), Jx< " — i =d .Therefore, if a+c<d<3(a+c), Jx<J2=d . If d<a+c, based on result 2, 
16 d/3 
with K * as the unique root to Z(K) =0 , 
T rrv*\ 1 / adK" .2 (a+c+d)
2 .,„,-, T T,,, ., r,,-
J2=J(K*) = - ( Y+- — if K'<\ or y,=7(l) if K*>1 . 
a+c 2[(l-K')a+c] 4(a+c) 
Let K, denote the unique root to ^^-- 2^ , then K (a+c)(a+c+d) 
4 2[(\-K)a+c] 1 a(a+c+3d) K h 
with (\-K.)a+c=— ->0 .Because 
a+c+3d 
-,„, 2d2(a+c)(a+c+d)r/ ,•> ,,. , ,„ ,,, n 
Z(KX) = - i il—-—-[(a+c)-+3d(a+c) + 18d
2]<0 , 
(a+c+d) 
we have KX>K' ,andby(Bl), JX<J2 . (B6) 
If ^l?)^ andd<3(a+c)'orifeitherd=0°r ^(^f" =f and d<3(a+c) but the distributor will not 
choose F *-— in the equilibrium contract of result 1, 
then F'+P'-Q+c+d, a+c+d 
~—+ -— . Same as just shown, /,</., . 
2 4 ' l 
(iii)Ifd,3(a+c), Jrd=J2 .If d=£(a+c) and
 (a+C+d)2 <£ , or if d=^-(a+c) 
6 8(a+c) 4 6 
(fl+c+df-_a a 
———— — and the distributor chooses F * = — in the equilibrium contract of result 1, as shown in (i), 
JrJ(KQ)=J(K')=J2 for K0=K' .If d=0 , (
a+c+^\l , and the distributor chooses F*=?- in 
%(a+c) 4 2 
the equilibrium contract of result 1, J,= =/_ . O.E.D. 
1
 4 2 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
(i) is self-evident with results 1 and 2. 
(ii) If a+c^d<3(a+c), in the equilibrium contract of result 1, 
w _ 7 (a+c+d)
2
1 7 (d+d/3)
2_ld . 
1 32 (a+c) "32 d/3 6 
in the equilibrium contract of result 2, W-,=d+ >—d . 
2 2 6 
A/3 
If ——(d+c)<d<d+C, according to the calculations of profits and (iii) of proposition 1, W ,<W2 . 
If (0< )d< ^—(d +c) and F'+P*= - in the equilibrium contract of result 1, according to (B6) and 
6 4 
(iii) of proposition 1, Wj<W2 . 
If 0<d<±L( 0<d<——(d+c) and F*+P *= +d in the equilibrium contract of result 1, as known in the proof of 
6 2 
Proposition^ W l - J ( K 0 ) + ^ < W ( K Q ) .where KQ-^- . Note that, in result 1, the equilibrium contract 
8 ^a 
with F*+P-=™+d implies «a and especially, c<a if d>0. Thus here K0<1 . In the equilibrium contract 
2 
of result 2, W 2 = W ) if 0<K'<1 or W2=W(l) if K*>1 , where K' is the unique root to 
Z(/0=0 . Here note that K * must be nonnegative for d<a+c. 
Let AT0 denote the unique root to — =0 .By(B3), K2 T7
- ' 
2 dK a(a+c+2d) 
Because (l-£2)a+c=
 {a+c)d >0 , we have ^H^>0 for VK such that ^<^2 . (B7) 
a+c+2d dK 
Z(KJ=d2{a+c)\ d(a+c) -2}-3d3{a+C)<Q - K*<K^ . (B8) 
a+c+2d (a+c+2df a+c+2d 
By(B5), K0<K'<K2 .Thus ^W^W *) = ^2 . 
(iii)Ifd*3(a+c), Wl=d+^-^=W2 . 
lfd=0, and F*=— in the equilibrium contract of result 1, V^,=—- -=W~ . Q.E.D. 
2 ] 8 2 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
(i) and (ii) are self-evident with Table 1 and Table 2 of the paper. 
r C 
(iii) If d=0 and c<a, 71 = — in both Table 1-2 and Table 2-2 of Appendix G 
4 
Ifd=0andoa, TUC=^+<^<— in Table 1-2 while nc=- in Table 2-2 
16 8 4 
Ifa+c<d, T:C<a+c in Table 1 while TCC=d in Table 2. 
denote the unique ret to ^ t , ^ ^ (.^g)) ,thatis, K3-
d^+C+d><0 .In 
16(a+c) 4[(l-£)a+c] 3 a(a+c) 
x w o c_[(l-AT*)a+c+d12 r 
Table2' * ~ ~ „., ~-=7Tc(/r*) , where 0</T<l and (\-K')a+c±d (seeappendix D). 
4L(1-A )a+cj 
Because ^fi^ -A(^-K)a+c]2-d2 . d7ic(£) n f 
Because — a , we have ^ >0 for VK such that (l-K)a+cad. Therefore, 
dK 4[(l-K)a+c]2 dK 
TIC(K3)<TI
C(K*) . 
If *C=4+^ of result 1, £+i<(fl+C^2=/(Q)</(r) . Q.E.D. 
4 2 4 2 4(a+c) 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Ifd^a+c, based on result 2, F*+P*| . ., . , . =d • 
'separated without vertical constraint ' 
based on result 3, F*+P*\ mgr ed=d ; 
3(a+c+d) 
based on result 1, F * + P * | , . ... 
i separated with vertical constraint 
if d<3(a+c) 
4 
d if d>3(a+c) 
Ifd<a+c, based on result 2, F*+P*| , . ., . , . =a+c+d adK* where 
'separated without vertical constraint n '
 n"^ly* 
2 2[(l-K *)a+c] 
0</T<l and (l-K*)a+c>0 ; 
a+c+d 
based on result 3, F'+P' 
merged 
based on result 1, F * + P * | , . .,u , , . =
3(a+c+d) 
'separated with vertical constraint A 
F* P*\ _a+c+d d 
'separated with vertical constraint-' ~ TT ' ^£•E'•1-'• 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
(i)If d^ a+c, based on result 2, S 
d+C 
separated without vertical constraint r. 
based on result 3, S 
d+c 
merged 
based on result 1, S\ 
(a+c+d)2 ^a+c_ (f di3(a+c) 
separated with vertical constraint 
=, 32(a+c) 2 
— if d>3(a+c) 
2 
If d<a+c, based on result 2, result 3, (B2) and 0<K * < 1 , 
d+C 5i _ (d+c)[(l-K')a+c+d]
z
> (d+c+d)
1 _„• 
'separated without vertical constraint ' «-,..».».., -.o _ O / \ lmeree^~ o 
8[(l-/T)a+c]2 8(a+c) * 8 
based on result 1, 5| 
separated with vertical constraint~ <=-
a+c 
(ii) If dsa+c, based on result 2, W | 
separated without vertical constraint =d-
d+C 
d+C based on result 3, W | ,=d+ 
merged 
based on result 1, W 
separated with vertical constraint' 
l(a+c+d)2 , a+c .„ , „ 
d+^~ if d>3(a+c) 
If d<a+c, based on result 3, W\_ j=
3(d+c+d) = 
8(a+c) 
merged ' o / _ . _\ "V.UJ 
based on result 2, with K * as the unique root to Z(K) =0 
W 
'separated without vertical constraint " ( m m ( / C ,1)) . 
By (B7) and (B8), W\ <W\ 
I merged I separated without vertical constraint 
Based on result 1, either W\ _l(a+C+d)~ „ H Y m 
'separated with vertical constraint 0/->/ •, ^ " V w 
32(a+c) 
or WI _ 3(a+c) d nu(X, ^ r> ™ 
I separated with vertical constraint 7. +~- W(\J) . Q.E.D. 
8 2 
Appendix C Proof of Result 1 
According to (1), (2), (7) and (8), 
nD=KF< 
1 if F>0, P>0, F+P<d; (RJ 
F r 
1 — if 0<F<a, P>-F+d, P<c+d, P>0; (P,) 
a a 
p 
1 — if 0<F<a, P>c+d, P>0; (P,) 
a 3 
0 if Fza, F+P> a+c+d, P>0; (P4) 
1~— if F>0, P>0, d<F+P<a+c+d, P<-F+d; (R.) 
a+c a
 5 
7IC=< 
P(l-^) 
C 
0 
0 
P(l-£^) 
a+c 
(1-/QF 
1 if F>0, P>0, F+P<d; (Pj) 
F r 
1 — if 0<F<a, P>-F+d, P<c+d, P>0; (P,) 
a a z 
1-— if 0<F<a, P>c+d, P>0; (P,) 
a 
0 if F>a, F+P>a+c+d, P>0; (P4) 
F+P-d r 
1 - if F>0, P>0, d<F+P<a+c+d, P<-F+d; (P.) 
a+c a 
The vertical contract has the cinema choosing P and the distributor choosing F and K. 
CascB Case A 
a+c+d 
a[c-d]/(2c) 
(c+d)/2 (c+d)/2 
(ifcsd)(ifcad) 
Figure C.l 
The distributor never chooses K=0. It is assumed that K*0 in the following. 
Step 1: Cinema's best choice of P in each region. 
In region R„ P*=d-F for VFe[0, d]. In region R2, *
c=P[l-(P-d)/c] + (l-K)F[l-(F/a)]. 37tc/dP=[(c+d)/c]-[2P/c]=0 
P=(c+d)/2. Therefore, 
Case A: if c^d, 
P* = 
h.c+d) if 0<F<—[c-d]; 
2 2c 
£p+d if —[c-d]<F<a; 
2c 
Case B: if c<d, P*=[c/a]F +d. See Figure C.l for these two cases. 
In region R5, 
nc=[P+(l-K)F](l-£^-) , 
a+c 
dTic_Q _ p_a+c+d-(2-K)F 
dP 2 
(CI) 
The line (CI) may take one of three possible positions, as shown by Figure C.2. Case 1 or case 2 happens if a+c<d. 
Case 3 happens if a+csd. 
40 
Case 1: if a+c<(l-K)d and a+c<d, then P* = (° Jf . ^ i ^ ' . 
[d-F if 0<F<d. 
Case 2: if a+c^ (1-K)d and a+c <d, then point N has F= ~a~C .Therefore, 
K 
P* = 
d-F if 0<F< d-a-c. 
lr~,„ ^ /o r^m •*• d-a-c c, a+c+d 
—[a+c+d-(2-K)F] if <F< ; 
tf 2-K 
n .c a+c+d j-, , 
0 if <F<a+c+d. 
2-K 
Case 3: if a+c^d, point G has F = — - — . Therefore, 
(2-K)a+2c 
CT? J * n F- a(a+c-d) 
—F+d if 0<F<—- —; 
a (2-K)a+2c 
lr ^ /o r^in •* a(a+c-d) „ a+c+d 
F*=^-a+c+d-(2-/0f] if — 1 — — f - < F < ; 
2 (2-K)a+2c 2-K 
„ ... a+c+d „ , 
0 if <F<a+c+d. 
2-K 
It is evident that the cinema will never make a choice in regions R3 and R4 
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40Because the definitions of 7tc and TTD on regions R„ R2 and R5 apply to the situation where c=0, this property 
implies result 1 also applies to the situation where c=0. 
F 
a+c + 
Case 2 
a[c-d]/(2c) 
(a+c+d)/2 \ > v 
(ifa+cd) (c+dPl \ifa + c i d ) 
Case I 
Figure C.2 
Step 2: Cinema's best choice of P (globally). 
If c<d, it is evident that the cinema's best choice from a global perspective choice will be region R5. That is, case 1, 
case 2 and case 3 above are all possible. 
If csd, then of course a+csd, case 3 must happen. It is easy to show point G is superior to point E in Figure C.2 (Note 
the conditions a>0, c^O and d^O). Thus, the cinema's globally best choice of P is 
P*=< 
\c+d) if 0 < F < ^ > ; 
2 2c 
£p+d if a ( c - ^ F . a(a+c-d) . 
a 2c (2-K)a+2c' 
-[a+c+d-(2-K)F] if a(a+c~d) <F<£±c+d. 
2 (2-K)a+2c~ 2-K ' 
n ;f a+c+d „ 
U it <F<a+c+d. 
2-K 
This P* is illustrated by Figure C.3. 
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F 
a[c-d]/(2c) ~ ^ S — 
(c+d)/2 
(ifc^d) 
Figure C.3 
Step 3: Distributor's locally best choice if csd. 
(1) Corresponding to HE (Figure C.3), the distributor's problem is 
{ maxKFn
D=KF(l--) S.T. 0<K<\ andQ^F<a(c"^ }. 
a 2c 
The feasible set of this problem is illustrated by OEGD in Figure C.4. d-KD/dF=0 =» F=a/2. Because [a(c-d)]/[2c]^a/2, 
the solution to this problem must be at the boundaries of the feasible region, which are OD: {K=0, 0^F< [a(c-d)]/[2c]}, 
EG: {K=l, <kFs[a(c-d)]/[2c]}, OE: {F=0, 0<K< 1} and GD: {F=[a(c-d)]/[2c], 0<K< 1). Then it is evident that K*=l 
, -, a(c-d) ., D a(c
z-d2) 
and F = — with nu=— . 
2c Ac2 
(2) Corresponding to EG (Figure C.3), the distributor's problem is 
{ m<ixKFn
D=KF(l-F) S.T. 0<K<\ and ^^-<F< a{a+C~d }. 
K'F a 2c (2-K)a+2c 
The feasible set of this problem is DGHC in Figure C.4. The first-order conditions will give rise to a unique point 
{K=l, F=a/2}, which is not an internal point of the feasible set. In other words, the optimal point must be at the 
boundaries of the feasible set. 
Consider at boundary GH: {K=l, [a(c-d)]/[2c]<F^[a(a+c-d)]/[(2-K)a+2c]}, 
rcD=F[l-(F/a)], a7tD/aF=l-[2F/a]=0 - F=a/2. Therefore, 
., a(a+c-d) a . , a 
if ->—, i.e., d < — , 
a+2c 2 2 
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F*=-, K* = \, with TI D=- ; 
2 4 
., , a -, a(a+c-d) „. , 
if d>—, F = — , A -1 , 
2 a+2c 
a+c+d 
[(a+c+d)/2] 
[a(a+c-d) 
/(a+2c)] 
[a(a+c-d) 
/(2(a+c))] 
a[c-d]/(2c) 
KF=(a+c+d)/2 
2/3 K s l K 
Figure C.4 
(a+2c)2 
Consider boundary HC: {0<K<1, KF=2(a+C)F'-(a+C-d) }, ltD=KF(l—) 
a a 
if 
^ 0 - Fafl[3(a+c)-41 . Therefore, 
3F 4(a+c) 
a[3(a+c)-d\^a(a+c-d) Rm=l F._a(a+c-d)^ w///j ^ato+c-rfXc+d) . 
4(a+c) a+2c a+2c (a+2cY 
a[3(a+c)-d] ^ a(a+c-d) j:._2(a+c)(a+c+d) F._a[3(a+c)-d] ^ nD=(a+c+d)
2 
4(a+c) a+2c a[3(a+c)-d] 4(a+c) 8(a+c) 
(3)Corresponding to GB (refer to Figure C.3), the distributor's problem is 
D KF(a+c+d-KF) 0 a(a+c-d) _ a+c+d , 
max^pTt = — ST. 0</C<l a/zd— — < F < . 
2(a+c) (2-K)a+2c 2-K 
The feasible set of this problem is illustrated by HNBC in Figure C.4. 
2/3 K, 1 K, 
Figure C.5 
d*°mmQ _ KF-^-
d(KF) 
Point S (see Figure C.4) is decided by ' 
a(a+c-d) 
n r\n+~>r rs 2(a+c)(a+c+d) 
{2-K)a+lc ^ wnich derives Ks= \ 
F= 
a+c+d 
2K 
5 a[3(a+c)-d] 
Point V (see Figure C.4) is decided by: 
a+c+d 
2-K 
a+c+d 
2K 
«4 
if K WW*'**) „, v/f-e[l. 11 F-=^i, ri* *
D - ^ 4 
a[3(a+c)-d] 3 2A" 8(a+c) 
(4) Corresponding to BA (Figure C.3), the distributor's problem is 
n KF(a+c+d-F) c „ n „ , , a+c+d „ , , 
{ vcvzxKFTr=— S.T. 0<K<\ and <F<a+c+d }. a+c 2-K 
The feasible set of this problem is illustrated by NAB in Figure C.4. The first-order conditions of this problem give rise 
to a unique point {K=l, F=(a+c+d)/2}, which is not an internal point of the feasible set. Thus, the optimal point must 
be at boundary BN:{0<K< 1, F ( 2 -K)=a+c+d). On this boundary, 7iD=[2F-(a+c+d)][a+c+d-F]. The optimal point 
is point V. 
Step 4: Distributor's globally best choice if cad. Figure C.5 illustrates the situation where [a(a+c-d)/(a+2c)]aa/2, 
i.e., where point Q is below to point H. Under this situation, the distributor's globally best and the associated 
equilibrium contract are characterized by: 
.. , a , (a+c+d)2 a 
if d < — , and 
2 
8(a+c) 4 
< " , K' = \, F'=-, P'=-+d, n
D=-, TTC C d .. a 
2 
c 
2 
.. , a , (a+c+d)- a w „ . r2 . ., _, Nn „ 
if d<—, and —>— , VAT e[—, min(l, K )], F 
2 8(a+c) 4 3 
4 
,_a+c+d 
2K' ' 
4 + 2 
p*=a+c+d_r3___\_, ^D_ (a+c+d)
2 ^c_ (a+c+d)
2 
2 2 K' ' 8(a+c) ' " 16(a+c) ' 
if d > - , VAT*e[-, min(l, Ks)], F'=
a+c+d^ 
2 3 2K* 
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p._a+c+d 3 1 D fa+c+d)
2
 c (a+c+d)
2 
0 t J, 71 , ft = 
2 2 K' 8(a+c) 16(a+c) 
Step 5: Distributor's globally best choice if c<;d. 
With c<d, the cinema's globally best choice is those it m a y choose in region R5. Thus, case 1, case 2 and case 3 in 
Figure C.2 should be analyzed separately. 
For case 1 in which a+c^(l-K)d and a+c<d, TtP=-
is K*=(d-a-c)/d, F*=d, with 7tD=d-a-c. 
For case 2 in which a+ca(l-K)d and a+c<d, 
d-a-c 
KF(\-—) if d$F<a+c+d; 
a+c ,and the distributor's best choice 
KF if 0<F<d; 
7r° = 
KF if 0<F<-
K 
„c.ra+c+d-KF1 ... d-a-c r a+c+d 
KF[—— • — J if — - — < F < -2(a+c) K 2-K 
„-ra+c+d-F' .f a+c+d 
KF[ J if <F<a+c+d; a+c 2-K 
(1) T h e solution to the problem 
{ m a x m ^ K F S.T.: [(d-a-c)/d]^K<l and 0<KF<d-a-c } is VK*e[(d-a-c)/d, l],F*=(d-a-c)/K* (andP*=d-
F*), with 7tD=d-a-c. 
a+c+d 
H JF(2-K)=a+c+d 
~N 
(a+c+d)/2 
d-a-c 
KF=(a+c+d)/2 
(2) To solve {maxKJ=Tt
D=KF(a+c+d-KF)/[2(a+c)] S.T.:[(d-a-c)/d]<K<l and (d-a-c)/K<F<(a+c+d)/(2-K) }. 
Region N B G of Figure C.6 is the feasible set. 
dllD 
d(KF) 
--0 KF= 
a+c+d 
Point E is {K=2/3, F=3(a+c+d)/4}. From Figure C.6, it is evident that, 
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., , a+c+d . , ~, * w r v r 2 11 F*= ,and (C2) 
if d-a-c< , i.e., d<3(a+c) , VA e| —, iJ. r *«»« 
2 3 2£ 
p._a+c+dr3_ 1 , v.D_(a+c+d)
2
 uc=(fl^£+df_ . (C3) 
2 2 £ * ~ 8(a+c) ' 16(a+c) 
., , a+c+d . , ~, >. w^.^r^~a~c n F"-
d~a~c pm=d-F" (C4) 
if d-a-c> , i.e., d>3(a+c) , V A e [ — - — . iJ. r — T 7 T T * r u r , v^ > 
2 d 2K 
7tD=d-a-c and Ttc=a+c. (C5' 
(3)To solve the problem 
a+c d 2-K 
dnD n r, a+c+d , a+c+d s 
HNB in Figure C.6 is the feasible set. =0 -» F = — - — ( <—-—— ) . 
3F 2 2-.K 
Therefore, the solution to this problem must be at the boundaries of the feasible set. On boundary HB (see Figure C.6), 
point B is evidently the optimal point, with F*=d and 7tD=d-a -c. On boundary BN, 7tD=[2F-a-c-d](a+c+d-F)/(a+c), 
ajtD/aF=0 - F=3[a+c+d]/4 and K=2/3, i.e., point E. 
To summarize, if a+c>0, c<d and a+c^d, the distributor's globally best choice as well as the associated equilibrium 
contract are characterized by (C2)-(C5). 
For case 3, a+csd and c<d, 
Tr° = 
KF(\-Z-) if 0 < F <
 fl(fl+c_d) 
a (2-K)a+2c 
ypra+c+d-KF, •, a(a+c-d) p a+c+d. 
2(a+c) (2-K)a+2c~ 2-K* 
„rra+c+d-F-. ., a+c+d „ , 
KF[ J if <F<a+c+d. 
a+c 2-K 
The equilibria are the same as when cad. 
Step 6: Movie-goers' surplus. 
From the above, we know that all the people who go to the cinema will buy a unit of snack food in all the equilibrium 
contracts. Therefore, if d<—, and L<_ > p'J.p*-
a+c ,j (a+c)d+d-F *-P *=0 -» fl =— 
\ > 2. 2 
S(surplus)=\[(a+c)Q+d-F'-P*]dQ=— . 
e„ 8 
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if d>3(a+c) , F'+P'=d , (a+c)0+d-F •-/>•=() ^ e =0 
S(surplus) = j [(a +c)0 +d-F' -P *]d0 =— • 
em 2 
Under other situations, P ^ P *- ^ (a+c+d) (a+c)0+d-F*-P*=O - 0 -
3 ( Q + C ) " ^ 
4 m 4(a+c) 
S(surplus)= J [(a+c)0+d-F'-P *]d0=l£l£l^l Q.E.D. 
em 32 
Appendix D Proof of Result 2. 
According to (1), (2), (7) and (8), 
1 if F>0, P>0, F+P<d; (Rx) 
1— if 0<F<a, P>-F+d, P<c+d, P>0; (/?,) 
a a 
TCD=A"F{1-— if 0<F<a, P>c+d, P>0; (P,) 
a 
0 if F>a, F+P>a+c+d, P>0; (P4) 
1-F+P~d if F^O, P>0, d<F+P<a+c+d, P<-F+d; (R,) 
a+c a 
TC 
Pd-^) 
C 
0 
0 
P(l-£^) 
a+c 
(1 -AOF 
1 if F>0, P>0, F+P<d; (Pt) 
1-— if 0<F<a, P>-F+d, P<c+d, P>0; (P2) 
a a 
1-- if 0<F<a, P>c+d, P>0; (P3) 
a 
0 if F>a, F+P> a+c+d, P>0; (P4) 
l_F+P-d .f ^^ ^^ d<F+P<a+c+d, P<-F+d; (P5) 
a+c a 
The contract in this part has no vertical price constraint. The cinema chooses F and P and the distributor chooses K. 
Step 1: Cinema's best choice of F and P (local). 
In region R,, P*=d, F*=0 (note that the distributor will not choose K=0), with 7tc=d and 7tD=0. 
In region R2, the cinema's problem is {maxFJ»Ti;
c=P[c+d-P]/c +(l-K)F[a-F]/a S.T.: 0<F<a and (c/a)F+d<P<c+d }. 
cV7aP=0 => P=(c+d)/2 .57ic/dF=[l-K][a-2F]/a=0 => F=a/2 if K^ 1, or VFe[0.a] if K=l. 
If K*l, substitute F=a/2 into P=(c/a)F+d, => P=(c/2)+d;>(c+d)/2 (note that d^O). Therefore, the point {F=a/2, 
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P=(c+d)/2} is not an internal point of region R, The solution must be on the boundary of ^ £ ^ g $ £ * 
even though K=l, the solution is still on the boundary. If c d and K=l, the points on Q N (see Figure D.l) are all 
solutions. 
In region R* Ttc=[P+(l-K)F][a+c+d-F-P]/[a+c]. Denote the determinant of the Hessian matrixof £by n. IWd-K)-
(2-K)2]/(a+c)2<0 (=0 only if K=0). Therefore the solution to this problem must be on the boundaries. 
Obviously, the cinema will never choose a point in regions R3 and R4except boundary DE. 
(ifK=l and c*d) 
P=(c+d)/2 
a+c+d 
a(c-d)/[2c] 
d c+d a+c+d 
Figure D.l 
Step 2: Cinema's best choice (global) of F and P. 
It has been shown in step 1 that, if (1) K=l and c^d, the cinema's best global choice must be on AB, BC, and/or QN; 
and if (2) K<1 or c<d, the cinema's best global choice must be on AB, BC, CD, C E and/or ED. 
On AB, Ttc=(l-K)F[a+c+d-F]/[a+c], 67rc/aF=0 - F=(a+c+d)/2. Therefore, F*=(a+c+d)/2 if a+c^d or F*=d if a+csd, 
and accordingly rcc=(l -£)i£I£I^I or 7ic=(l-A")d . 
4(a+c) 
On BC, the distributor will never set K=0. The optimal point of the cinema is {F*=0 P*=d} which is also a point of 
CD. 
On CD, ^ = [li^^£F+d][l-^] ,3^/dF=0=> p--_W-K)a+c-d] if d,(1.K)a+c or F*=0 if d,(l-
a a 2[(1 -K)a+c] 
K)a+c). Accordingly, TC c_[(l-K)a+c+d\
2 
P-d 
4{(\-K)a 
— or7:c=d.OnCE, nc=P(\~LZl) , F*=0, P*=(c+d)/2 ifc^dor P*=d 
+CJ c 
41, 
Because the definitions of rcc and *» on regions R„ R2, R4 and R5 applies to the situation where c=0, result 2 
also applies to the situation where c=0. 
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if csd, accordingly nc=^C+ or 7tc=d. On ED, TXC=(1 -K)F(\ -—) , P*=c+d, F*=a/2 if K*l or VF*e[0, a] 
4c a 
ifK=l,with7tc=(l-K)a/4. 
The optimal choices of the cinema on these boundaries as well as the associated profits are summarized in Table D-l 
and Table D-2. 
Table D-l 
AB 
a+c^d a+c<d 
CD 
d<(l-K)a+c d;>(l-K)a+c 
F*=(a+c+d)/2 
P*=0 
TC C=(1-A0 
(a+c+d)2 
4(a +c) 
F*=d 
P*=0 
7tc=(l-K)d 
a[(l-K)a+c-d] 
2[(l-K)a+c] 
p,_c{(\-K)a+c-d] ]d 
ii 
2[{l-K)a+c] 
c_[(l-jQa+c+d]
2 
4[(l-K)a+c] 
F*=0 
P*=d 
7tC=d 
Table D-2 
CE 
C2:d 
F*=0 
P*=(c+d)/2 
c (c+d)2 
vr=- — 
4c 
c<d 
F*=0 
P*=d 
7tc=d 
QN 
(if K= landed) 
VF'6[0, a(C'd)] 
2c 
?*_c+d 
2 
^c (c+d)2 
71 = 
4c 
ED 
F*=a/2ifK*lor 
VF*e[0,a]ifK=l 
P*=c+d 
7tc=(l-K)a/4 
Given K>1 and c2+d2*0, (l-K)(a+c+d)2/[4(a+c)]>(l-K)a/4; if a+c<d, (l-K)ds(l-K)(a+c)>(l-K)a/4. Therefore, the 
maximum value of if on ED is strictly dominated by that on AB, i.e., the cinema's best global choice of F and P will 
not be on ED. If d<(l-K)a+c, then of course d<a+c. 
Because d{[(\- K)a+c+(l -K)d]2/[4((l-K)a+c)]}/6o0, 
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of which a, leases* tav*y holds. ,f d2(.-K)a+c and a«2d. i. can be shown fta, O - K W / ^ O X d . 
bJ^ad^^ 
If c;>d, (l-K)a+c^d,and it can be shown that 
[(\-K)a+c+d\2 ^ [c+d]2 (equality h o l d s o n i y if K = 1 ) . Therefore,if 
4[(\-K)a+c] 4c 
c^d and K*l, the cinema's best global choice is { F 
. a[(l-K)a+c-d] r. c\(l-K)a+c-d]^ } „,ttl 
2[(l-K)a+c] 2[(l-K)a+c] 
^cja-fQa+c+d]2 a n d ^__Ka[(l-K)a+c]
2-d-
4{{\-K)a+c\ 4[(l-K)a+cY 
If csd, and if (l-K)a+c<d, P*=d and F*=0, with Tcc=d and TCD=0. 
If c<d, and if (l-K)a+c^d, the cinema's best global choice is the same as when c;>d. 
If K=l and c2+d2*0, from Table D-l and Table D-2, we know that the cinema's best global choice is still not on AB 
and ED. 
To conclude. Table D-3 below summarizes the cinema's best global choice and the associated profits of the cinema and 
the distributor. 
Table D-3 
K*l K=l 
cid c<d csd c<d 
F,_a[(l-K)a+c-d] 
2[(l-K)a+c] 
p._c[(\-K)a+c-d] _d 
2Kl-K)a+c] 
nc=Kl-K)a+c+d]
2 
4[(l-K)a+c] 
2_^2 
4[(l-K)a+c]2 
d<(l-K)a+c 
F._a[(l-K)a+c-d] 
2[(l-K)a+c] 
p._c[(\-K)a+c-d] _d 
2[(l-K)a+c] 
ncA(l-K)a+c+d}
2 
4[(l-K)a+c] 
^^[(l-fQa+cf-d--
4[{l-K)a+c]2 
d*(l-K)a+c 
F*=0 
P*=d 
7tC=d 
7tD=0 
'F*e[0, 
a(c-d) 
2c 
„ c+d 
71 
(c+d)2 
4c 
ll
D=Fm(\-—) 
F*=0 
P*=d 
7tC=d 
7TD=0 
Step 3: Distributor's best choices of K and the associated equilibrium contracts. 
With the "friendly" tie-breaking assumption noted in the paper, if K=l and c;>d, the cinema will choose F*=[a(c-
d)]/[2c] (and P*=(c+d)/2). Thus, Table D-3 is reduced to Table D-4. 
Table D-4 
c^ d 
F._a[{\-K)a+c-d] 
2[{\-K)a+c] 
p._c[(l-K)a+c-d] ,d 
2[{\-K)a+c] 
^cAa-IOa+c+d]2 
4[(l-K)a+c] 
j>_KA(l-K)a+c?-d
2 
4[{\-K)a+c]2 
c<d 
d<(l-K)a+c 
F,_a[{\-K)a+c-d] 
2[{\-K)a+c] 
p._c[{\-K)a+c-d]^ 
2[{\-K)a+c] 
^cJd-IOa+c+d]2 
4[(l-K)a+c] 
^Ad-IOa+cf-d2 
4[(1 -K)a+c}2 
d^(l-K)a+c 
F*=0 
P*=d 
7tc=d 
7CD=0 
Definef(K),Ka{[(l-K)a+cf-d2}/[2(l-K)a+2c]2. f(0)=0, and f(l)=a[c2-d2]/[4c2]. Thus, f(l)*0 if c*d or f(l)<0 if c<d 
f'(K)=[a/4]{[(l-K)a+c]3-[(l-K)a+c]d2-2ad2K}/[(l-K)a+ct Therefore, f'(K)=0 - [(l-IQa+c]3 - [(l-K)a+c]<f - 2acf K=0 
?^ n e5? C ) s [ ( 1" K ) a + C ] 3" [ ( 1" K ) a + c ] d 2' 2 a d 2 K- z'(K)=-3[d-K)a+c]2a- ad2 <0. Therefore, there is at most one root to 
f (K)=0 for Ke[0,1]. Z(0)=(a+c)(a+c-d) (aO if a+c* d). Z(l)=c3-cd2-2ad2. Z((a+c-d)/a)=-2d2(a+c-d). 
The distributor's globally best choice of K as well as the associated equilibrium contract are characterized by: 
if c*d and Z(l)=c3-cd2-2ad2^0, K*=l, F*=(c-d)a/[2c], P*=(c+d)/2, 7tc=[c+d]2/[4c] and 7tD=a[c2-d2]/[4c2]; 
if csd and Z(l)=c3-cd2-2ad2<0, K* is the unique root to Z(K)=0 for Ke[0,l] F._g[(l-/Qa+c-d] 
2[{\-K)a+c] ' 
P'-C^~K)^C~d]'d >^h TtcA(l-K)a+c+d]2 „o_rA(l-K)a+c]2-d2 
m-K)a+c] 4[(1_/0a+c] - * a _ _ _ ; 
if c<d and a+c^d, the equilibrium contract is the same as if c;>d and Z(l)=c3-cd2-2ad2<0-
if c<d and a+c<d, F*=0, P*=d, 7ic=d and TTD=0. 
Step 4: Movie-goers' surplus. 
From the above, we see that all the people who come to the cinema will take snack foods within the cinema in all the 
equilibrium contracts. Therefore, for the equilibrium contract which has F*=£^> and P* 21± 
2c 2 ' 
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(a+c)d+d-F'-P*=0 - 0 m = £ ^ , S(surpluS)=}[(a+c)Q+d-F'-P*)dQ--(<^^ • 
2C ft n 1 8cz 
for the equilibrium contract which has F *-[(1 ~K *)a+c~a1Q and P* K
1^')a+c-d]c 
2[(\-K')a+c] 2[(1 -A *)a+c] 
(a+c)0+d-F*-P*=O - 0 -M-K*)a+c-d] 
2[(1-A *)a+c] 
S(surplus)=j[(a+c)Q+d-F'-P'^-{-a+c^(l~K^a+c+d^2 . 
e- 8[(1-A *)a+c]2 
for the equilibrium contract which has F*=0 and P*=d, (a+c)d+d-F"-P *=0 -» 0 =0 
S(surplus) = j [(a +c)0 +d-F * -P *]d0 =-2l£ . Q.E.D. 
em 2 
Appendix E Proof of Result 4. 
According to (3), (4), (7) and (8), 
TtP=KF\ 
1 — if 0<F<a, F+P>d\ (Q.) 
a 
1 if 0<F<a, F+P<d, P>0; (Q2) 
0 if F>a, P>0; (03) 
The contract in this section allows the cinema to choose P and the distributor to choose F and K. 
Step 1: Cinema's best choice of P. 
7TC=< 
fo 
P(^-) + (\-K)F\ 
a 
0 
1 -- if 0<F<a, F+P>d, P>0; (0,) 
a 
1 if F+P<d, F>0, P>0; (Q2) 
0 if F>a, P>0; (Q3) 
In region Q2, the cinema's best choice is P*=d/2 if 0<F<d/2 or P*=d-F if d/2<F<d. In regions Q, and Oj, P*=0 if F*d 
or P*=d-Fif 0<F<d ("friendly tie-breaking assumption"). Therefore, the cinema's globally best choice of P is shown 
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as in Figure E.l.42 
Step 2: Distributor's best choice of F and K and the associated equilibrium contract. 
In region Q2, K*=l and F*=d, with 7t
D=d. In region Q,, the distributor's problem is 
{ maxK.F7c
D=KF(l-F/a) S.T. 0<K<1, F*0 and F+P**d }. 
d[F(l-F/a)]/aF=0 - F=a/2. 
Owing to a^d, of course a/22d/2 (see Figure E.l). With K*=l and F*=a/2 (then P*=max(0, (2d-a)/2)), 7tD=a/4. 
Therefore, if dsa/4, the distributor should set K*=l and F*=d (then P*=0, i.e., point W ) ; if d<a/4, the distributor 
should set K*=l and F*=a/2 (then P*=max (0, (2d -a)/2), i.e., point V). It should be mentioned that, if d<;a/4 and the 
distributor sets F*=a/2, even though P*=0, a half of the population will go to the cinema but none of these movie-
goers will buy snack foods. If d*a/4 and the distributor sets F*=d, all the people will go to the cinema but only some 
of them will take snack foods. Under the equilibrium contract when d<a/4, the total surplus of movie-goers is 
1 
S x = j (aQ -—)dQ=— . Under the equilibrium contract when d;>a/4, the total surplus of movie-goers from watching 
1/2 2 8 
Mathematically, Q, can be extended to include the points on W G with the value of TCC (TtD) at a point on W G 
being defined as the limitation of a series of values of if (nD) at a series of points within Q, which converges to this 
point. Such extension allows Q, to be closed and TCC (TTD) to be continuous on Q, But two different values of Ttc (TCD) exist 
at each point on W G , one denned from Q, and the other defined from Q,. However, the value of rcc (as well as TtD except 
at point G) defined from Q, is larger than that defined from Q,. Thus this extension has no impact on analyzing the 
cinema's (the distributor's) globally best choice. 
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the movie Sm=^(ad-d)dd=^
d ; only the people 
such that 9e[0, d/a] buy snack foods, with the total surplus 
d/a 
d2 . ., from snack foods consumption being S,= f (-a0+dWfl=— ;« if^^/A *.,_ -,x • •„ , . 
v L^XI.0 ^ jv u\j+u)au—— , i.e., it d^a/4, the equilibrium contract will result in 
o 2a 
a total surplus of movie-goers of S2=Sm+Sf=^
a~<®~ . Q.E.D. 
2a 
Appendix F Proof of Result 5. 
According to (3), (4), (7) and (8), 
T C D = A F 
1 — if 0<F<a, F+P>d; (Qx) 
a 
1 if 0<F<a, F+P<d, P>0; (Q2) 
0 if F>a, P>0; (Q3) 
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C=l 
fo 
P(±E) + (j.j^ 
a 
0 
1 — if 0<F<a, F+P>d, P>0; (O.) 
a ' 
1 if F+P<d, F>0, P>0; (Q2) 
0 if F>a, PsO; (Q3) 
The contract in this section allows the cinema to choose P and the distributor to choose F and K. 
Step 1: Cinema's best choice of F and P in each region.43 
In region Q2, the cinema's problem is 
{ maxFJ7t
c=(l-K)F+P[(d-P)/a], S.T. F*0, P*0 and F+P<d }. 
The determinant of the Hessian matrix of 7tc is zero. Therefore, the optimal point of the cinema must be among the 
points of the boundaries of the feasible set or among those satisfying the first-order conditions. The first-order 
conditions and the "friendly tie-breaking assumption" make F=d/2 and P=d/2,44 which is point N on W C of Figure F. 1. 
On the boundary W O , the cinema chooses F=d (and P=0) if K<1 or VFe[0,d] (and P=0) if K=l; on boundary OC, F=0 
and P=d/2; on boundary W C , F=[d+(l-K)a]/2 and P=[d-(l-K)a]/2, if (1-K)a<d or F=d and P=0 if (l-K)a^d. The 
cinema's best choice in region Ci, is the point F=[d+(l-K)a]/2 and P=[d-(l-K)a]/2, if (1-K)a<d, or F=d and P=0, if (1-
K)a*d, which respectively lead to 7tc=[d+(l-K)a]2/(4a) or 7tc=(l-K)d. 
43. 
The foomote of appendix E applies here. 
44Without the "friendship assumption", P=d/2 and VFe[0, d/2] satisfy the first-order conditions when K=l. 
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d 
a/2 
Qs 
\r S' 
Q' f\c 
O d/2 d 
Figure F.l 
In region Q „ Ttc=(l-K)F(l-F/a). The maximum profit the cinema can obtain is (l-K)a/4 with F=a/2. 
The cinema will never choose a point in region Q3 
Step 2: Cinema's best global choice of F and P. 
With the assumption that d>a/4, 
r_[d+(l-K)af 
ifK=l(;>l-(d/a)), Ttl 
4a 
>(l-A)-=0 
4 
if 1-^A<1 , uc-^^^->A\-K)d>(\-K)^ ; 
a 4a 4 
if A<1-- , 7ic=(l-A)d>(l-A)-
a 4 
Therefore, the cinema's globally best choice is the point with F=-i——: — and />=i£_LL_^i£i ,if(i-K)a 
leading to 7tc= , or the point with F=d and P=0 if (l-K)a^d, leading to 7tc=(l-A)d 
4a 
The cinema's best global choice and its associated profits are summarized in Table F-l. 
Table F-l 
a 
F'=d 
P'=0 
nc=(\-K)d 
Tt° =Kd 
K>A-d 
a 
F,_d+(\-K)a 
2 
p._d-(\-K)a 
2 
^cJd+d-AOa]2 
4a 
no=Kd+(\-K)a 
2 
Step 3: Distributor's best choice of K and the associated equilibrium contract. 
With Table F-l, if K>A-d , J>=K±£^° . 
a 2 
_d_{Kd+(l-K)a _ K=a+d^ . a+d_>A_d_ _ d>J_ . 
dK 2 2a 2a a 3 
^d+a_ „D_yd+(\ -K)a _ (a+d)-^ _ d^ wherg ( 1 . £ ) d is the maximum profit the distributor With A=-=-^ , n u = K 
2a 2 8a a a 
can obtain when K is limited by K < \ — . Therefore, if d > — , the distributor will choose K'=—— .resulting 
a 3 2a 
in the equilibrium contract to be { F * = — — , P 
, d+a D. 3d-a D_(a+d)
2 _, _c_(a+d)2 
7t =• 
8a 
and TC =• 
16a 
if d < - the distributor will choose A * = l — , resulting in the equilibrium contract { F*=d , 
3 ' a 
P'=0 , n° = (StlM and 7 t
c = — }. 
a a 
Step 4: Movie-goers' Surplus. 
All the population will go to the cinema. If d>-| , the total surplus from viewing the movie of the people is 
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5 =/( a0-£I^)d0=£-^ . If d < - , the total surplus from viewing the movie of the people is 
o 4 4 3 
S^=J(a8 -d)dd =?-?£ . To calculate the total surplus from snack foods is a bit complex. If d> — , we know 
*"" o 2 J 
that F*=^- and P'=^Zl . The solution to a0--^=O is 0=—^- , which is also the solution to 
4 4 4 4a 
-aQ +d-——=0 . That is, individuals for which ——<0< 1 experience a positive surplus from viewing the 
4 4a 
movie but will not buy snack foods. All other patrons will buy snack foods. The total surplus from snack foods of this 
(a+d)K4a) 
32a 
setis Sfl= J (-ad +d-^-^-)dd = ^ * — .If d < 4 , we know that F
m=d and P*=0 . The solution 
to ad -F *=0 is 0 = — , which is also the solution to -a0 +d-P * =0 . Thus with d<a/3, individuals for which 
a 
O<0<— will buy snack foods within the cinema. Their total surplus from snack foods is 
a 
d/a , 2 
Sa= j (-aQ+d)dQ=— . Therefore, the total surplus of movie-goers under the equilibrium contract 
o 2a 
* SSml+Sfl-^t if d*± .„ S-Sm2+Sf2-^t if d_<f . Q.E.D. 
~>2a 3 2a 3 
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Appendix G: Some special cases calculated according to Table 1 and Table 2 
Table 1-1 Result 1 if c=0 
d<(y/2-\)d 
a>0,c=0, d^O 
(j2-l)a<d<3a d>3a 
K* = l, 
F* 
P* 
nc 
71° 
s= 
a 
=d, 
d 
"2' 
a 
V d 
8; 
., 2(d+d) 
In Table 1-1, A > — -
s 3d-d 
\/K*c[±rrun(l,K)], 
3 
F* = 
d+d 
2K* 
pt_a+dr3 1_, 
7tC = 
2 2 K* 
(a+d)2 
16a 
%DJd+d)
2 
S= 
8a 
(d+d)2. 
32a 
\/K *c[—,l], 
d 
r, d-d 
F = , 
K* 
P*=d-F\ 
nc=d, 
TiD=d-d, 
s=--
b 2' 
Table 2-1 Result 2 if c=0 
d<a 
a>0,c=0,d^0 
d^ a 
K * is the unique root 
to Z(K)=0 with Ke[0, 1], 
F,_[(\-K')a-d\a 
2{(l-K')a] 
P'=d, 
nc_[d-K*)a+d]
2 
4[(1-A*)a] 
„D ^„[(l-A')a]2-d2 
7X =A a , 
4[(1-A>]2 
5_a[(l-A*)a+d]
2. 
8[(1-A>]2 ' 
VK'elOA], 
F*=0, 
P'=d, 
7rc=d, 
7lD=0, 
5=--
S 2' 
In Table 2-1, Z(K)=[(\ -K)a]3-[(l -K)a]d2-2ad2K 
(2)With d=0, Table 1 and Table 2 are respectively reduced to Table 1-2 and Table 2-2. 
Table 1-2 Result 1 if d=0 
a>0, csO, d=0 
a^ c 
A* = l, 
F'=£, 
2 
P'-C-, 
2 
^ c 
n T 
•KD~— 
4 
c a+c 
8 ; 
a<c 
VA*e[-,min(l,A)], 
3 
F._ a+c 
2A* 
p._a+c.3 1 
2 2 A * 
16 
D a+c 
32 
In Table 1-2, K =
 2(a+c) 
3a 
Table 2-2 Result 2 if d=0 
a>0, c^ O, d=0 
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K* 
F* 
P* 
7TC 
nD 
5= 
= 1, 
a 
= 2' 
c 
c 
V a 
= 4' 
a+c 
8 ' 
(3)With c=a/2, Table 1 and Table 2 of the text are respectively reduced to Table 1-3 and Table 2-3. 
Table 1-3 Result 1 if c=a/2 
a>0, c=a/2, d;>0 
d<(J3--)d 
V 2 
(J3—)d<d<—a 
v 2 2 
, 9 
d>—a 
2 
c a d 
7IC= — + — , 8 2 
4 
•J , 
16 
V/Te[|,l], 
_, 3d+2d 
r , 
4K* 
,_3d+2dr3 1 , 
4 2 /r ' 
71 
c_(3a+2d)
; 
96a 
%D_(3a+2d)
2 
48a 
5_(3a+2d)
2. 
192a 
V/Te[ 
2d-3a 
2d 
.1], 
„, 2d-3a 
r , 
2A"* 
P*=d-F\ 
c 3 
n =—a, 
2 
D A 3 
7t - d — a , 
2 
4 
Table 2-3 Result 2 if c=a/2 
a>0,c=a/2, d^O u 
10 
K* = l, 
-» a-2d 
F = 2 ' 
„* a+2d 
4 ' 
1Tc_(d+2d)
2 
Sa ' 
a",'2-"2, 
4a 
s_3(d+2d)
2. 
16a 
/5 ,3 
-!—a<d<—a 
10 2 
/v * is the unique root 
to Z(K)=0 with Ke[0, 1], 
F,_(3-2K')a-2d 
6-4/T 
pt_(3-2K*)d-2d]d 
12-8/r 
7rc_[(3-2rr-)a+2a]
2 
(24-16K')a 
^D_FA(3-2K*)a\
2-4d2 
(6-4K*)2a 
5_3a[(3-2/r)a+2a]
2. 
16[(3-2^*)a]2 
A 3 
d>— a 
2 
V/Te[0,l], 
F*=0, 
P*=d, 
7TC=d, 
71^ = 0, 
~ 3a 
4' 
In Table 2-3, Z(A>(2-/03a2-(2+A)d2 . 
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